THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
FORT BENNING, GEORGIA
MAILING LIST 1980 - 31
MAILING LIST
FOREWORD
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CHAPTER
I
II III IV Vv VI Vil
Vill
APPENDIX
I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page Experiences in the first days of War ................ 5 Infantry Reorganization ......... cialbakidnibiabddicadiak ae Infantry Problems . tie eilaaiaitinencapniidcelbeaialee. Defense by small Infantry Units -....................... 60 Ammunition Supply aida biiesieliadapaantmaeaiiaiainaile 67 Antiaircraft Defense __............ sili wuss Problem—Battalion in Attack -.................. soa Personal Experience Monograph .....................-.--. 85
Instructional Matter and Map Reference ........ 103
CHAPTER I EXPERIENCES IN THE FIRST DAYS OF WAR.
A lecture delivered by Captain Adolf von Schell, Staff Corps, German Army, to the officers of the 29th Infantry at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, January 24, 1931.
Captain von Schell was commissioned a second lieu- tenant in the German Army in 1918. As either a troop commander or staff officer he saw service with front- line troops during the entire period of the war, both on the Eastern and Western Fronts as well as in the Ukraine and Caucasus. ._He was wounded four times for which he wears the German decoration for wounds. He was also awarded the Iron Cross, 2nd Class and Iron Cross, 1st Class. At present he is attending the Infantry School as a member of the Advanced Class.
Gentlemen:
I want to tell you about the great difficulties which must be met by troops at the commencement of any war. Please keep in mind throughout my talk the following facts: the troops with which we began the war were exceptionally well trained, splendidly disciplined, and possessed a remarkable morale. All our leaders, officers and noncommissioned officers, knew their duties to the fullest extent.
I had also the great advantage of going to war with an active regiment, in which all the men were young and therefore were in the finest physical condition. But no one knew anything of the impressions of battle and no one knew how the human being would react to all these impressions. Yes, no one could even say with any certainty how he himself was going to react to battle impressions. We, therefore, were entirely unacquainted with the future. Under these circumstances it would have been very valuable if the members of each unit
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had at least known each other. But this was not the case. For reasons which we do not need to touch upon here, all officers changed their duties on mobilization. Generally they remained in the same regiment but took over the command of new units, the men of which they did not know and by which they were not known. I be- lieve today that this was a mistake. Inasmuch as the new impressions in themselves meant a serious Lurden to everyone, it would therefore have been better if a mutual understanding and a feeling of unity could have been created as a counterweight to the new impressions.
We crossed the border between Germany and Belgium on the 7th of August 1914. We had on this day a short march after crossing the border and came finally to a little village, the name of which I have forgotten. Our com- pany was 240 men strong. The sun was just about to go down when suddenly an airplane appeared above us. We were in hostile territory. We had never before marched into a hostile country and had never met an enemy. All of us were very nervous and excited over the events which we felt were sure to come. For this reason we were at once certain that an airplane in hostile territory could only belong to the enemy. We heard a shot, then several, and in a few seconds our entire com- pany was shooting. Next we heard somewhere in the distance machine guns taking up the firing; then we saw even artillery shells bursting in the air. Now every dou’* disappeared. If the artillery was firing, it must be ax. enemy plane. I remember that even the Iriver of our field kitchen shot with his pistol at the poor aviator. Our psychological excitement was satisfied by the wild shooting. The aviator continued to fly for some time and then seemed to sink to earth. We raised a loud cry of joy because we believed we had hit him, and nearly the entire company started in order to take him prisoner. Gradually the men returned with foolish expressions on their faces like a young hunting dog which has been vainly chasing a rabbit. Next day we received a division order which began as follows: “It is only due to the
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very bad shooting of the troops that today two German aviators are still alive——.”
In the meantime it had become dark. Now the ques- tion arose where the company was to sleep. In the village were about thirty to forty houses. It would have been the natural and proper thing to do to have used all, or at least most of the houses. But please remember the mental condition in which we were. It is true that we had not heard nor seen an enemy. We also did not know what our mission would be in the next few days. But we were in a hostile country; we believed that at any moment the enemy could appear. It was dark: dark- ness is the enemy of humanity. At night everyone seeks to be near others; there is a constant pressure to draw together. The result was that the entire company billet- ed together in a single large house, so that naturally no one could get much rest.
Now came the question of security. It is true we had learned in peace that at night in open warfare, one should only place sentry posts on the main streets, because in unknown terrain the enemy in war of movement can only approach during the night by roads. But all this was forgotten. My platoon, about 80 men strong, was given the mission of providing the security. I was just as excited as everyone else. I therefore put my entire platoon on guard. This means that constantly one-third of my men, thirty in all, were simultaneously on sentry duty. The sentry posts were established all around the house. Having established them, I went back into the house. Suddenly a shot rang out, then an- other, then several, then suddenly a message came in, “The Belgians are coming.” I ran outside to a sentry and asked him, “What’s wrong?” “There they are behind that bush,” was his answer, and he fired. Nothing moved. Now a shot rang out in another place, then at another further on. Nothing could be seen. I ran from one sentry to another and sought to quiet my men. For a while it would be quiet, but then soon again, the firing would break out. As soon as one sentry fired, several others did the same thing.
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Such panic firing I very often experienced later on in the war. Generally there was no reason for it. An especially good example I might, however, mention now. In September 1916 during the great Russian offensive under General Brussiloff, I relieved a company of Aus- trians with my own company. The commander of the Austrian company told me that every night very heavy firing took place. It was true. It had hardly become dark when the Russians began a very heavy fire. This time, however, I had a company which consisted solely of experienced men who had already been in a large number of fights. No one fired because they could see nothing. But they waited impatiently for the Russians to attack. Nothing happened. The next night the same thing occurred. But by the third night the firing was appreciably less, and a few days later there was no firing at all during the night. The reason for this is always the same, that psychological excitement is ever satisfied by firing. The result is that men use up their nerve strength and throw away ammunition. So it was here in Belgium.
Finally the night came to an end and it began to be light. I ascertained that hundreds of shots had been fired. Then we searched the immediate vicinity, for so much shooting must certainly have caused hostile casual- ties. We searched and searched and finally found one dead cow.
This happened with exceptionally well trained troops. The reasons must be searched for in psychology. It was just our first experience in hostile territory, and the experience, new to all of us, affected us not only in our capacity as soldiers, but as human beings.
Then we marched further. The day before we had not met an enemy; therefore today we must meet him. The psychological excitement diminishes only when one has passed through his first fight. Our company marched at the head of the battalion. I received the mission to go ahead with a few of my men as a patrol towards a village which lay 5 kilometers in front of us. I did not receive any information with regard to the enemy be-
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cause my company commander himself did not know anything about it.
I moved forward. The village was still in front of me; there was no sign of life in it; it seemed dead. A hot sun shone down from a blue sky. There was not a breath of wind; it was quiet, mysteriously quiet. What could be in the village? It seemed certain that they would allow me to come close to it and then suddenly open fire on me. I therefore left the road and drew near to the village through a little gully, so as to ap- proach this mysterious place from the flank. I frequently stopped and looked through my field glasses. On one occasion I thought I saw movement in the village, but then it became again still, mysteriously still Now I came to the gardens behind the village. Every moment I expected to meet the enemy. Soon I would be able to actually see the main street. I wanted to observe the enemy. Therefore, I began to creep and crawl, care- fully and slowly through the garden to the road. Finally I reached it. There stood a battalion of the 56th Reg- iment, which was a part of our brigade. This bat- talion had spent the night in the village. Later we learned that we were almost at the tail end of our division and that everywhere around us German troops were moving forward. One learns very quickly how- ever and we soon believed that we were experienced soldiers, whereas, as a matter of fact, it took us years to become such. It is undoubtedly better to say there is no end to learning, especially in war.
Next day we had a long, very tiring march towards Liege. It was almost dark when we halted and were billeted in a chateau. After a few hours of rest we were again awakened. It was still completely dark. Soon we met also the other companies of the battalion. We moved forward at a very rapid pace. We were told that on that day we should storm one of the forts of Liege. Suddenly there was a tremendous noise which was fol- lowed by a loud whistle over our heads. This whistling came rapidly closer; it seemed about to come down on us. “That must be the heavy artillery of the enemy
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firing at us,” we thought and a large percentage of my company promptly lay down on the ground. Nothing, however, happened and we soon knew that it was our own artillery which had opened fire. It was, however, also the first real shell of heavy artillery which we heard in the war. It had given us a terrible fright but the men were soon laughing again and those who had laid down on the ground showed their shame. At this time we were not experienced enough to decide whether it was our artillery which was firing, or that of the enemy, whether the shell came from in front or the rear. Later, one learned to differentiate exactly, i. e., we learned to know whether it was our own artillery or the enemy’s which was firing, whether the shells came from the front or from the rear, whether they would go over us, or whether we had to take cover, whether it was a gun that was firing, or a howitzcr,—yes, even what caliber was firing. We learned to differentiate between French, English or Russian artillery; yes indeed, if one carefully listened and had some experience, one could decide whether the enemy was firing with shells or with gas. Towards evening of this day ve stormed the fort. Gentlemen, perhaps you will ask why I have talked to you about these little matters. The reason is this, it is my experience that we all know much too little of the little incidents of war, and especially of combat at the beginning of a war. In peace we generally learn how to lead companies, battalions, regiments, even div- isions and armies. We learn in books and by maps how yne fights and wins battles, but not what feelings the soldier in the front is filled with and how he is to meet them. I believe, however, that this will be still more important in a future war than it was in the past. Machinery rules the modern battlefield. We soldiers, however, can control the machine best if we know not only how it works, but also its moral effect. In all peace maneuvers such matters cannot be depicted; one can only learn from experience or through very careful study of military history. I believe that it is a duty of every commander in peace to inform his soldiers about
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all these matters, both small and great, which in war have an effect on morale and on his nerves. Now what can we learn from these little stories that I have told you? In my opinion, three things:
(1) At the commencement of war, there prevails in all soldiers an especially great nervousness. FEvery- where dangers are seen. Our imagination shows us things which actually do not exist. Therefore, inform vour soldiers in peace about all these matters.
(2) When you become commanders, be careful, both in sending and receiving reports. You can be sure that at the commencement of a war 90 per cent of all reports are false or exaggerated. Learn in peace as you prepare your map problems, field exercises. and war games, to include false or exaggerated reports: other- wise, as commanders, you will become used to believing all information which you receive.
A short story from my own experience will illystrate this point.
During the afternoon of that very day, about which I was just speaking, I was sent on patrol against the fort. I finally reached a hill, and so as to see better, climbed a tree. My men remained below on the ground. Right in front of me was the fort, but as I had never seen a fort before, I didn’t recognize it as such. Suddenlv there was a loud crash, and an artillery shell burst. just in front of, or actually in the branches of my tree. It was the first hostile artillery shell which I ever heard. As a result: I fell ignominiously off my branch to the ground. My first thought was, “Now I am dead.” As I hit the ground, however, my bones told me that I was en- tirely alive. My men had run away. As I learned later, they had run back to the regiment, and probably to ex- plain their desertion of an officer—had stated that I had been killed, which report was believed.
(3) You saw that our company already on the first day of the war, marched into hostile territory and had no knowledge of the situation. You must know in peace that in war of movement you will never have suf- ficient information of the enemy. Otherwise, you will
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send an equally stupid lieutenant on a patrol, who for hours will crawl through the gardens and finally locate your own troops. In the war of the future it will become even more difficult for the troops at the front to obtain much news of the enemy. More machine guns will be active in the hostile front lines, and will prevent your getting close to them, and in so doing will deceive you with regard to the strength of the enemy. To be sure, the aviators will give more information than in the last war. Such information, however, will go to the staffs, far be- hind the front, and when you learn their information in the front line, it will generally be too late. I therefore am closing with the following words, “If the real war gives you better information you will enjoy yourself.”
CHAPTER II
THE PROVISIONAL INFANTRY REORGANIZATION
Major Albert Henry, Infantry,
Calivada National Guard. Dear Al:
Pursuant to your instructions, I eased around to the tactics section here at the school and asked a few dis- creet questions. I realize how it is out there with you,— a brand new organization slammed at you and not much indication of how to use it,—so I am very glad to be able to report progress. I didn’t expect to get a very hearty reception, but they took me right in and told me more stuff than I could remember. If I don’t write it down quickly, I'll forget half of it, so here goes.
In the first place, Al, let me tell you how this new infantry organization was developed. The general staff was deeply impressed with the heavy infantry losses during the World War and was therefore anxious to mate full use of all existing mechanical means to spare the doughboys. A great increase in automatic fire was desired. Large companies were believed necessary, so that their battle life could be prolonged in spite of heavy losses. No weapons not now in actual use by the army were to be considered. This was to be an actual, not a theoretical, reorganization. Hence the various boards had to figure on a redistribution of rifles, automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars and 37’s, so as materially to increase the ratio of automatic fire per man. They could not do this by simply cutting down the rifle strength, because a large company was one of the re- quirements.
Of course you know what they did. They put two automatic rifies in each squad instead of one. They added a platoon to the battalion machine-gun company. They added a regimental machine-gun company, exactly like the battalion company. They made the howitzer com-
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pany into the cannon company, still a regimental unit, and gave it eight mortars and eight 37’s.
ihese modifications in our organization give us now in the regiment 324 automatic rifles instead of 162; 64 machine guns instead of 36; 8 mortars instead of 3; and 8 guns, 37-mm, instead of 3. The aggregate strength is 3698 instead of 3106. We have, therefore, increased largely the automatic firepower per man, while retain- ing a large company and making use of weapons already available. Notice that the regimental commander, how- ever, is now in direct control] of the regimental machine- gun company and the cannon company. He holds in his own hand a very considerable source of fire-power, and as a consequence, has a greater responsibility than here- tofore in forwarding the progress of the action. The heavy burden of the battalion commander is partially shifted to the regimental commander and the latter has a greater opportunity for influencing and guiding the action than formerly. So when you get your colonelcy, you can’t just go to sleep, like old man Myopia—you’ll still have your part in the show.
We got down to cases right away, and when I asked them what you asked me: “How are we going to use it,” they gave me some dope about as follows:
Because of the increased proportion of automatic weapons, we are now better prepared to cover any given piece of ground. We can cover more ground than formerly, and just as efficiently. In the attack, we are safe in leaving larger gaps along the line, because we can sweep them with fire better than formerly. The tendency will therefore be to increase the frontage and largely absorb the increase in the enlarged gaps. These gaps will be very useful to us in developing our machine- gun fire, and enemy fire falling in them will not cause us casualties. That sounds all right to me.
Naturally, when we extend our front, it will be harder to communicate with all our units, and hence harder to control them. They put a lot of emphasis on this state- ment, Al,—“The factor of CONTROL is paramount, and
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should indicate to us very clearly that all our methods ani formations must be SIMPLE.” That’s true enough for your gang, and it’s truer yet of the war crowd. They also said that on the battle-field it is easier to control units disposed in the direction of advance than those disposed laterally. There will thus be a tendency to form units in column more frequently than before. This fits in with our plan to leave gaps along the line. Of course, if the situation calls for the early development of a large amount of fire-power, the front will have to be exterded, but otherwise we will do well to give preference to the column formation.
When I asked them if there was any guide for front- ages, they gave me this table as an indication of what is believed to be suitable under average conditions in a decisive attack.
PIII <scsscoiecsicdsaddecindabssbdasiahiaioiantauiaagialaiieieiiadiaannas 50 yards ee 175 yards rT 250 yards COMIN cnecessctteesss ... 500 yards Battalion 1000 yards INI: ..ccrisichiniiihthiteipieiniulidiiatiasaiicbieiiibipalnlaated 2000 yards
They were very careful to warn me that under varying conditions wide departures from this table are to be expected, so don’t take it as anything fixed and un- changing.
As I was in no condition to hear about both at the same time, we took up the attack and the defense separately, to see what to do with our changed and added units.
First, the ATTACK.
Starting with the squad, we have two Browning auto- matics instead of one. Since we figure that one of these guns delivers fire equal to that of four riflemen, two of them will equal eight riflemen. There are, exclusive of the corporal, who should be directing the fight rather than taking part in it, five riflemen left in the squad. The automatic-rifle fire thus dominates in the propor- tion of eight to five. (Is that the proportion of time and
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attention you give these two weapons in training? If I remember rightly, your outfit used to carry the automatic rifles around in parades, just the way mine did, but we never went very deeply into the training necessary for their effective use. (About two jams and we called it a day.) There seem to be a lot of people who do not like the automatic rifle, but we have it, just the same, and they tell me in the weapons section it can be made to do efficient work in the hands of well-trained men. Until we get a better weapon, it behooves all concerned to pay enough attention to this one to make it pay dividends.
With two of these weapons in a squad, it will at times be desirable to group them and form a little base of fire around which riflemen will maneuver. In the section and platoon this will be unusual, and in the squad, if as many as four men maneuver, an automatic rifle should be sent with them. The supply of ammunition in the squad will be more difficult, and reserves will have to be used to carry it forward to front-line units. And here’s the dope on the normal assignment of duties in the squad that you were anxious about:
Front rank—No. 1, scout; No. 2, assistant AR; No. 3, assistant AR; No. 4, corporal.
Rear rank —No. 1, scout; No. 2, AR; No. 3, AR; No. 4, second in command, riflieman with grenade discharger.
That wasn’t the way I had them arranged, but I must admit I like it better. The automatic rifles should be kept in action as long as possible, riflemen being assigned to man them if the AR, and assistant AR, become casual- ties. Well, that’s reasonable, too.
‘he next thing I asked about was the increased size of the battalion machine-gun company, with its four platoons of two sections each, of two guns each,—16 guns to the company. What shall we do with them in an attack?
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In the first place, the company will normally be used as 2 unit under battalion control. Before the jump-off, it should be located where it can best fire in support ot the attack. When its fire becomes masked by the advance of rifie units, if no other suitable targets are available, it should start forward under cover toward the next probable firing position from which it can help the rifle-
men. When the rifle units are held up, the machine-gun company must support them promptly, and this can be done only if it follows them closely. The progress of the machine-gun company is thus a series of successive moves from one firing position to another, in each of
which it assists in breaking down enemy resistance. The entire machine-gun company does not normally move as a unit; in the usual case certain platoons are assigned to support front-line companies, and these platoons con- form to the movements of the units they are backing up, the machine-gun company commander retaining control of the company as a whole.
Now, in cases where you can’t give close support to a rifle company by guns under control of the machine-gun company commander, as for instance, when the rifle company is attacking through heavy woods, or when making a wide envelopment or turning movement, that’s different. In cases like that, since there should be only one commander responsible for the attack, the machine- gun unit which is to support the rifle company com- mander should be under his direct orders; in other words, attached to the rifle company.
Right here I have something definite for you about how the machine-gun units are expected to work after the jump-off. It is not advisable to assign zones of action to machine-gun units, as this would tend to re- strict the maneuver of riflemen who, in the long run, must actually prod the enemy out of position. The ma- chine gunners must take advantage of the gaps which will frequently exist between front-line rifle units. Pro- vision for these gaps should be made before the jump-off. Thereafter they will be forced on the attacker by the
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fire of the defense, which will permit advance by rifle- men only where cover exists. ‘The advance of rifle units will thus be irregular, and gaps, both laterally and in depth, will almost always exist. Machine-gun platoons should be worked forward into these gaps in order to secure flanking fire across the front of adjacent rifle units, particularly those that are checked. See how it works?
By the way, they still plan to use machine-gun over- heac fire to support the attack. It seems that the safety rules were drawn up chiefly in order to prevent accidents in »~eace-time maneuvers. The War Department has for- bidden overhead fire in training problems but here at the school they are working on a revised set of safety rules des:gned to permit more frequent use of overhead fire in war.
Here’s the answer to another question of yours. If any machine guns are sent down to battalions from the regimental machine-gun company, they simply become part of the battalion machine-gun company and are used in exactly the same way as the guns of that company. That looks like a common-sense way of doing it, too.
As to the threat of attack from the air, it will not be necessary to designate a particular platoon to be habitually prepared for antiaircraft defense, because all guns should, as a general rule, be prepared to fire on the most dangerous target, and when airplanes become such a target, they will automatically draw the fire of our guns. The decision on this matter can safely be left to the man at the gun.
Now we come to the regimental machine-gun com- pany that was worrying you so much. How shall we handle it during an attack? Well, it isn’t as intricate as we thought it would be. They tell me that this machine- gun company is a means given the regimental commander for influencing the action. To merely split it up and attach it to battalions would defeat the purpose for which it was constituted. It will, therefore, normally be hela under regimental control, and rarely split up for
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attachment to battalions. In an attack, it will be em- placed and used to support the advance as long as possible. It will then be held under regimental control as a reserve of fire power, or for antiaircraft defense, or tor flank protection, or to repel counterattack, etc. As the attack progresses, if resistance is met, too stubborn for the battalions to handle, the company may then be split and attached, although if possible to vse it as a whole, this should be done. After such a point of re- sistance is reduced, the company again becomes a reserve, as before, to be handled as the judgment of the regimental commander dictates.
It won’t do, Al, to simply attach platoons of this company to front-line battalions and get rid of them that way; you have to sometimes, but if the guns ec.» svnnort without being separated from the company, thev remain under regimental control. When platoons are senarsted from the company, then you always have to attach them.
In the unusual case where the company is not needed to support the attack, one or more platoons will normally be emplaced for antiaircraft defense. Where the com- pany is used to support the attack, the platoons under regimental control will support the attack. just as at present in the case of the battalion company. And by the way, here’s something to remember,—on the march two platoons will normally march with the field trains for defense against aircraft.
Besides the regimental machine-gun company, the colonel also has a cannon company. This cannon company as now organized is a very respectable source of fire-power. Eight 37’s and eight mortars are not to be sneezed at, and the mortars especially will be most welcome sup- porters of the advance of the rifle units. Thev haven’t yet found a solution for the problem connected with handling in one platoon, weapons of such different char- acteristics as the 37-mm gun and the mortar, but in spite of that, the situation, with respect to what help
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the battalion commander can reasonably expect from his regimental commander, has materially improved.
Notice this, Al,—unlike the regimental machine-gun company, the cannon company will not normally be em- ployed as a unit under regimental control, but one or more platoons will be attached to front-line battalions, the remainder being held under regimental control. No platoon wil! be sent initially to a battalion in regimental reserve.
When the attack starts, each front-line battalion will have: with it one platoon of the cannon company. The remainder of the company will usually fire on tar ret: which promise to impede the advance of the battalion making the main effort. As the attack progresses, the platoons held out by the regimental commander will move up and be used by him, as in the case of the regi- mental machine-gun company, to assist in reducing stubborn points of resistance. The platoons that are attached to front-line battalions will be employed as platoons, and the platoon commanders will carry out any orders the battalion commanders may have for them, but the fire missions will normally be by section for the mortars, and by single gun for the 37’s. The platoon commander will have a most difficult job, and it will rarely be practicable for him to have any tele- phonic communication, either in the company or platoon; he will work through the section leaders, but since em- placements for mortars are usually widely separated from those for guns, he will have to decide where he can be of most service, and go there. Usually it will be with the mortars. The lieutenant who handles these weapons will always have an alibi.
With the regimental machine-gun company and the increased number of cannon-company weapons, the regi- mental commander has a considerably more important role to play than formerly. With better means at his disposal, he will be able to intervene more often and pro- vide timely assistance to an overburdened battalion com- mander. So there won’t be so much point in your getting
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promoted all of a sudden, Al; it isn’t so soft at regimental headquarters any more.
Well, that gives you about all I can remember about the attack. Probably I’ve left out a lot but if you can use what l’ve written, you’re a better man than I am
here’s the dope on the defense. As in the attack, with an increased proportion of automatic weapons, we are better prepared to cover any given piece of ground, or we can cover more ground just as efficiently as before. So they have re-vamped the table of frontages and now claym that under average conditions we can cover ground as follows:
ES ee 75 yards PII. is cccssenisineuacncncsimaiecasimelitiameaninadanndion 200 yards EE ae ne ae ELE 400 yards | RSET E ne weenrEe Ene Soren van =e 800 yards NN i a 1600 yards PIII: : sitesi. stuscsnsnsiieebaietidhieaiaeinitihieiaiaataicigdia 3200 yards
We have to remember, as in the attack, that wide de- partures from this table are to be expected under vary- ing conditions. You can see, Al, that we are extending considerable. That’s a lot of ground. This extension alone might tend to weaken rather than improve our defense, but with it there will be a greater echelonment of strength in depth, and also a greater proportion of reserves, which will be held mobile. I'll translate this for you, Al, in case it hits you the way it did me. We are going to hold more ground, but we are not going to do it by putting the same number of men per yard up front as we had before. In fact, we'll put in very few up there, relying mostly on automatic fire. As you come back through our position, you’ll find groups here and there,—riflemen and machine guns on a likely ap- procch, or rifle units under cover, ready to move to any one of several threatened points. The farther back you go, the bigger these groups are. We don’t put them in lines of trenches any more and tell them to hold on,-—we hide them, dope out where they may be needed, and move them to where the trouble breaks out. This (21)
disrosition of our troops fore and aft in the position is what they mean by the echelonment of strength in depth; it makes enemy progress harder the farther he zZoes. Ancé when you figure that the groups we keep readv to move anywhere are a larger percentage than ever of the whole force, you can see that we aren’t partic larly pinned down to any certain line of defense. It leaves us free to act as we choose. They believe here at the school that this is only what the Field Service Regulations have always prescribed,—a defense disposed in depth which opposes increasing resistance to the attacker as he makes progress into the position.
Now for the automatic rifles. As in the attack. we aim: to keep the automatics in action, and as the men who serve them become casualties, we replace them bv rifle- mer. As to how this weapon will be used, we must rer.ember that the squad is the team and that both automatic rifles are part of it. To this extent thev can never be said to work individually. Usually thev will have the same targets; usually, then, they will work together, and it will be exceptional when thev fire in- dividually on separate targets. The less expert our automatic riflemen are, the more important is it to use the weapons together. I guess we'll have to pav more attention to training.
In the squad it will be a normal procedure to have both automatic rifles assigned to cover a certain area or avenue of approach; in the section and platoon it will be unusual to so group them. Knowing your interest in this matter, I tried to get all the dope I could on it,—if there is something I’ve missed, drop me a line.
As in the attack, the battalion machine-gun company will normally be used under battalion control, although many situations will develop where the attachment of a platoon to a front-line company will be fully instified. If guns are sent to battalions from the regimental ma- chine-gun company they become part of the battalion ma- chine-gun company, and remain with it. Any guns at- tached to companies of the battalion should come from the
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battalion machine-gun company and not from the cegi- mental machine-gun company. Naturally, they know each other better. The fire of such guns should, when- ever practicable, be included in the battalion plan of fires. As to the use made of these guns, no definite rule ean be laid down, either that they will fire solely in defense of the area assigned the company to which they are attached, or that they will be used solely for flanking fire in front of adjacent units. The manner of their employment will have to be decided in accordance with the terrain and the situation. Because of the nature of the terrain, it may be impossible to use them either in one way or the other, and, again, a particular situation may indicate a special method of employment. !n most cases a reasonable assignment of missions will include bot classes of fire.
I asked them how they expect to apportion the guns through the position so as to get the increasing resistance they seek, and what proportion of guns will be used as first defense guns and what as break-ihrough guns. They tola me the usual proportion will be 50-50. At first this did not look to me much like opposing increased res:stance as the attacker progresses, but after I got the explanation I could see the point. I[t is not the idea to post the guns in two distinct bands, or strips,—one forward and one to the rear in the position. The for mation will be rather the checker-board, and in saying “first defense” guns we mean not only those up front, but also those farther back which can bring fire to bear on an attacker in the early stages of his assault. Further, if the enemy does break into the position, in no case will we lose all our first defense guns,—some of them will be withdrawn and posted again farther to the rear to continue the defense as break-through guns.
On defense, they don’t figure on holding the entire regimental machine-gun company under regimental con- troi. Depending on the situation—(I’m getting so ! can say that just like an instructor)—one platoon may be attached to each front-line battalion, or sometimes two platoons or even more may be attached to a battalion;
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if you have a flank battalion, for instance, or maybe one with a very wide front. What the regimental com- mander knows about the enemy’s probable intentions will alsc have a lot of influence on how far he’ll go in turning guns over to battalions.
You don’t have to worry about AA defense,—all ma- chine-gun platoons will be ready for it but will not be emplaced primarily for that purpose. All you have to reriember is that they engage the most dangerous tarzet.
Of course, Al, you know how practical I am, so I asked exactly what it is that this machine-gun company is going to do. Well, you’d be surprised. The company, or anyway whatever part of it remains under regimental control, has missions as follows:
(1) Harassing missions in front of the main line of resistance.
(2) Barrage missions filling gaps in the band of fire formed by the normal barrages of the field ar- tillery, the final protective lines of first-defense ma- chine guns, and the prepared infantry mortar fires.
(3) Fires to support the defense of the battalion reserve area.
(4) Fire to support counterattacks.
(5) Fires in defense of the regimental reserve area.
(6) Fires to check penetrations and envelopments.
If they do all that I guess we can’t expect much more and by the way, here’s a point,—these missions are similar to the ones that the machine guns of the reserve battalion will have, so you have to coordinate them.
Now for the cannon company, in case you’ve read this far. Don’t try to hold it all under regimental con- trol; just attach a platoon to each front-line battalion and hold on to the rest of it. And if there is a battalion in regimental, or brigade reserve, do not attach a platoon to it initially. You’d be losing the services of a unit you can use to good advantage. These platoons that are attached to front-line battalions will be employed as platoons as far as practicable, although generally it
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is going to be necessary to assign fire missions by mortar section and by single 37-mm gun. In case of attack by tanks, if the probable line of approach of the tanks can be foreseen, then the 37-mm guns may be grouped for antitank defense. The big problem is to so locate them that they will best be able to develop the maximum fire on their targets. If they ever are so grouped, then the CO Cannon Company, will command them. And in case more than one platoon is attached to a front-line bat- talien, the senior platoon commander will be in command of all.
There is an idea here that in the absence of artillery, it right in some cases be practicable to group the mortars to perform artillery missions, if the range permits, but they don’t expect much from such an arrangement.
Well, Al, that’s about all. A few general points came up, which I might summarize as follows:
On the march and in bivouac, until combat is imminent, the regimental machine-gun company should be placed in an advantageous position for the AA defense of elements outside the battalions,—trains and establishments, etc. Pait of the regimental machine-gun company might be attached to the outpost troops, but this will hardly be the usual procedure. And by the way, they expect the outpost to put up a stiffer resistance, because of the increase per man of automatic fire. Not much is expected from counterattacks by company supports,—the first serious one is expected from the battalion reserve, and this should be more effective than at present; more men and more guns being available.
I don’t remember anything more, Al. I only wish I knew what I’ve written you. If I could absorb that much, I’d have a better chance of getting a proper solution occasionally. But I never was a school man,—just a tough old field soldier.
Cheerio,
Yours, Ed
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(NOTE :—Training regulations have not been amended to cover the organization or all the methods indicated in the foregoing article. The Infantry School is required to teach the new organization and is engaged in preparing the drafts for the Infantry Manuals. For the present, therefore, the new departures indicated are tentative and not to be accepted as adopted for the service.)
G. C. M.
a ay ll
CHAPTER III
INFANTRY PROBLEMS
FOREWORD
The following problems are intended to bring out:
(1) The difference between operations which, in a given situation, may be undertaken with veterans, and those ad- visable with partly trained or slightly trained troops. (2) The vagueness of information which may be ex- pected in mobile warfare, the necessity of making de- cisions despite this, and the desirability of aggressive action; this lack of detailed information in regard to the enemy, the element of the unknown, has been, and probably always will be, the usual situation in war; situa- tions in which very detailed information of the enemy is known, as in some of our map problems, will be the un- usual case. (3) Employment in various kinds of attacks of infantry units of the new organization.
A problem with a sketch or diagram is stated on one page. To get the most from these problems the reader should come to a definite decision in each case before
turning the page to find the solution.
While one definite solution is given in each case it is realized that there are frequently other solutions which might work as well or better. There are many elements or considerations which cannot be indicated on a sketch or in a map problem; therefore readers are requested to consider solutions as tendencies rather than cut and dried “Thou Shalts.”
No one standard method will answer all cases; in map problems we usually show all our attacks beautifully co- ordinated by the commander. This is highly desirable but often impracticable. If we never do anything in war that is not coordinated to the Nth degree, we stand an A 1 chance of not doing anything.
Aggressiveness, simplicity, maneuver and _ surprise should be striven for. If vour solution contains these, it is better perhaps than the one given.
The problems are not intended to lay down rules; they are meant to stimulate thought. (27)
PROBLEM NO. 1
The Lacedaemonians are not wont to ask how many, but where the enemy are— Plutarch, King Agis.
SITUATION.—An infantry battalion advancing north- west encounters a small hostile force on the hill at A. The advance guard, one rifle company, has been stopped at the little stream west of hill B. The rest of the bat- talion is under cover behind hill B. At 9:00 AM the battalion commander decided to attack. His troops are well trained veterans.
REQUIREMENT.—(1) What is each company, in the attack order, ordered to do?
(2) How is the attack coordinated?
(3) If the troops have had little training, what is each company ordered to do?
(4) How is the attack coordinated?
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a
MAP FoR ProBLEM N2 1
ithe shoe Dee
SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 1
(1) The advance guard company is ordered to attack astride the road in direction of A. One rifle company with a platoon of machine guns attached is ordered to move to the general vi- cinity of D and attack to the southwest. One rifle company is ordered to move to the general vicinity of H in battalion reserve. The machine-gun company (less one platoon) supports the at- tack from positions on B.
(2) The enveloping company is ordered to fire a rocket when in position. This rocket will be the signal for the attack.
(3) With partly trained troops, the advance guard company will attack astride the road. One rifle company will move to E and attack slightly south of west. One rifle company in reserve will move to C. The machine gun company will support the attack from B.
(4) When each company is ready, it will so report to the Bat- talion commander. The Battalion commander will have a rocket fired from a designated place as a signal for the attack.
Attachment of machine guns to rijle companicvs composed of troops having had little training is relatively less desirable. The company commander will have his hands full without having to handle machine guns. The simplest methods, and those in which control by the commander is easiest, will be used. In order to simplify the matter of control, prevent the troops from having to make such an abrupt change of direction as the attacks converge, and reduce the danger of our own troops firing into each other, the envelopment in the case of partly trained troops is not so wide, and the reserve is more centrally located. Because of their aptness at maneuver, supporting distance is greater with trained than with untrained troops. As the time required for movement of the enveloping troops is difficult to calculate with certainty, coordination should be by signal. More precaution in this matter would be taken with partly trained trvops.
Likewise the question of direction with partly-trained troops must be given particular consideration. fF is near the crossing of the unimproved road over the stream. It can be found by following clear-cut terrain features, things that can be seen and readily recognized. Jf there were no well-defined approaches to FE, or if the company commander were inexperienced. the battalion com- mander himself might accompany the moveaient of the enveloping force initially, in order by his own training and experience to in- sure against the ever-present danger of loss of direction. nr any case it is the flanking movement which is the hard part; this would be the principal concern of the battalion commander.
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PROBLEM NO. 2
’E’s the man that done us well An’ we'll follow ’im to ’ell Kipling, “Bobs’’.
The Captain of the rifle company designated to make the enveloping attack in the preceding problem, has just received his orders. His troops are only partly trained and he is to attack from E.
REQUIREMENT.—(1) Route to be taken to E.
(2) Formation of the company during approach march including position of Captain and Ist Sergeant.
(3) Action taken by Captain upon approaching E.
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 2
(1) The route taken by the enveloping company is north through eastern part of woods C and woods to the north thereof, until unimproved road is reached, thence along unimproved road and edge of woods to vicinity of E.
(2) The company moves with an advance guard of a sguad and with scouts on both flanks for security. The Captain with runners moves with the advance guard, and conducts the march. The company moves in column of platoons, platoons in column of twos. The Ist Sergeant follows at the rear.
(3) Upon approaching E the compamy commander makes a personal reconnaissance, has platoon leaders move forward and issues orders from a position from which the enemy’s position can be seen.
Concealment of the movement is highly important. The situation is obscure on the north. Hence the approach march is made in column of platoons, following covered approaches. This formation facilitates maneuver and control, and lends itself to meeting the unexpected. An approach march on a wide front in a more extended for- mation in this situation might easily result in confusion, loss of direction and intermingling of units.
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PROBLEM NO. 3
Lay bare as the paunch of the purser’s sow to the hail of the Nordenfeldt— Kipling, “Ballad of the Clampherdown.”
SITUATION.—Two interior battalions, about to partici- pate in an attack by day to the north, are in assembly positions. Each commander intends to use two rifie com- panies in assaylt. Each battalion is supported by ar- tillery. The enemy is on the hills north of the line of departure.
The first battalion has almost no cover between its as- sembly position and line of departure. The second bat- talion has cover as indicated on the sketch.
REQUIREMENT.—Formation of each battalion in mov. ing to line of departure.
NOTE.—Two separate and distinct operations, one by each battalion, are depicted.
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 3
The first battalion will advance in time to cross the line of departure at the time of attack. It cannot form up there. It will therefore advance with the two assault companies abreast, the machine gun company following, and the reserve later. Assault companies would have lead- ing platoons in squad columns preceded by scouts. Ma- chine-gun company formations would be similar to those of the riflemen. Rear elements of the battalion would be in section columns. The battalion would depend for pro- tection on supporting fire (largely artillery) and on an extended formation. Smoke might be used.
The second battalion would move, preceded by patrols, in column of companies. Companies would be in column of platoons and platoons in column of twos, taking ad- vantage of cover and all under battalion control. On ap- proaching the line of departure assault companies would move to their positions and form for attack under cover.
PROBLEM NO. 4
To be once in doubt is once to be resolv’d— Shakespeare, “Othello”
SITUATION.—In Sketch A the scouts of the leading section of a platoon advancing northward have been fired on from hill X. The leading section, behind hill Y, is ordered to attack to the front. What does the section do?
In Sketch B the scouts, as they cross hill H are fired on from G. The section is just starting to advance from hill K. The section is ordered to attack to the front. What does the section do?
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™ i if i ° 100 200 300 Yards
MAP FoR PRoBLEM N2& 4
a
SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 4
The section in Sketch A occupies a firing position on hill Y. Attempts to build up the line of scouts in this situation probably would result in heavy losses and de- struction or material lowering of the section’s combat efficiency.
The section forms what may be called a firing line but no attempt is made to keep a straight line or regular in- tervals between men. In fact this is avoided. Advantage is taken of local cover.
The section in Sketch B builds up on the line of scouts. The firing position of the scouts in this case is suitable and can be reached without undue exposure.
Invariably building up on the line of scouts is faulty procedure as the scouts will usually be in an unfavorable locality when fired on.
Likewise, while the sketches show six scouts in each case, the invariable use of all the scouts of a section is an error. If two will suffice, only two should be used, and the strength of the section conserved.
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PROBLEM NO. 5
In courage keep your heart, In strength, lift up your hand— Kipling, “For all we have and are.”
SITUATION.—A platoon in Sketch C is attacking northward. The leading section is firing from N at the enemy post at M. The rear section is in a depression at P.
REQUIREMENT.—(1) What is the fire distribution within the section at N and within squads?
(2) Enemy fire from M weakened and the section at N advanced as shown by the arrow. Its advance halted when it observed enemy machine-gun fire, source un- determined, as indicated on the sketch. What does the platoon leader do?
(3) The situation in sketch D is the same except that the machine gun fire is coming from the west. The sec- tion by moving forward to the right can avoid this fire, but further advance has been stopped by fire from M. What does the platoon leader do?
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 5
(1) In Sketch C the fire distribution of the section at N is as follows. Each squad covers approximately one- third of the section target. Within each squad each rifle- man fires on that part of the squad target opposite him. He fires at places where he has seen or suspects an enemy. Both auto riflemen distribute their fire over the entire squad target.
(2) The platoon leader has the leading section continue to fire on M, while he advances the rear section from P in the western portion of the zone of the platoon to take M.
(3) In the situation in sketch D, the platoon leader advances the section at P to a firing position where it can fire on M, and thus enable the leading section to advance in the right portion of the zone and take M.
The rear section usually is the maneuver element of a platoon. It may be used on occasion to cover the advance of the leading section by fire.
When rifle units approach close to the enemy, support- ing fire of machine guns and artillery has to lift. Rifle units therefore must usually cover their own advance to assaulting positions at the closer ranges.
Some men must fire while others advance. Squad and section rushes, however, seldom will be desirable.
PROBLEM NO. 6
If you want to win your battles, take an’ work your bloomin’ guns— Kipling, “Snarlevow.”
SITUATION.—An interior battalion, with a cannon platoon attached, and supported by artillery, is attacking northward. The road is the line of departure. The enemy holds Hills A and B. There is cover in some parts of the battalion zone of action, but not in others. The hill at C affords machine-gun positions more than suf- ficient for one platoon, but scarcely sufficient for two platoons. The troops are well trained veterans.
The regimental machine gun company from near D assists by long-range indirect fire at the start of the attack.
REQUIREMENT.—(1) Where will the riflemen ad- vance, and in what general formation? (2) What is the initial employment of the machine-gun company and the cannon platoon? (3) What weapons are firing in the zone of the battalion in the early stages of the attack? (4) What changes will be made, if any, in the methed of fire support when the ridge A-B is captured? (5) How would the answers to the above be affected if the troops were only partly trained? (6) Would the employment of the regimental machine-gun company be the same?
II = Pel me ES: ru
C oretiedl 4 Woods > D | a, i 7 i rn i 1 ale i iin 1Yards Q. 500 1000
MAP FOR PROBLEM N2 6G
SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 6
(1) The riflemen will advance where there is cover. They will move forward in small groups and clusters, and by individuals at times, but retaining the tactical in- tegrity of units. The skirmish line will be avoided. It is conspicuous and gives the enemy excellent targets.
(2) The machine-gun company will support the attack from positions on C and from gaps left on purpose be- tween the rifle companies and on the left flank. The cannon-company platoon will support the attack from positions in the vicinity of C.
(3) As the attack starts, supporting machine guns fire on the enemy on Hills A and B. The 37-mm gun fires on any located machine guns. The 75-mm mortars fire on enemy combat posts and machine guns whose position is only generally known. Artillery fire also is placed on the enemy position.
Riflemen and auto riflemen do not fire. Dependance for gaining fire superiority at the outset is placed on the base of fire (the supporting machine guns and cannon company weapons in this case), and the artillery. In the attack, riflemen and auto riflemen usually will not do much firing at ranges over 400 yards. They endeavor to advance as far as possible under cover without firing, and engage in the fire fight only when forced to do so.
(4) When the Hills A and B are taken, one platoon of machine guns will be attached to the left assault com- pany which has to go through the woods.
(5) With partly trained troops the machine-gun com- pany would support from C and the gap left in the center. This gap would be larger and have more guns in it. Thus control of the machine-gun company would be simplified. The left assault company would not have guns firing past both its flanks, the moral effect of which might prevent a determined advance. A machine-gun platoon would be attached to the left assault company as before.
(6) Whether indirect fire would be delivered by the regimental machine-gun company would depend on its state of training.
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PROBLEM NO. 7 It is the customary fate of new truths to begin as here- sies and to end as superstitions— Huzley.
A flank battalion is attacking to the east. It holds hill B and the western edge of woods W. The forward limit
of the hostile battle position seems to be well in front of A, as indicated on the sketch.
REQUIREMENT.—Scheme of maneuver of the bat- talion.
ALTERNATE REQUIREMENT.—The forward limit of the hostile battle position is on hill A. There do not seem to be many troops on the forward slope. What is the scheme of maneuver of the battalion?
ae A
: 1 Yards 1000 2000
a o
MAP FOR PROBLEM NO 7
SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 7
In the first case the battalion will “fix” the enemy in position by machine gun fire from B while rifle units advance in column of companies through woods W to strike the enemy in flank.
It seems that the enemy in this case can be “fixed,” that is, kept fully occupied and prevented from shifting troops to a more threatened locality, by machine gun fire alone. The decisive attack can thus be made stronger. The requisite conditions for fixing by fire alone are good observation for the adjustment of fire and lack of good avenues of withdrawal for the enemy being subjected to fire.
In the second case the enemy on hill A cannot be “fixed” by automatic fire alone, since he is at liberty to shift the bulk of his troops behind A to meet the decisive maneuver. Therefore in addition to machine gun fire from B, he must be “fixed” by the advance of one rifle company from B toward A, while the rest of the battalion executes the maneuver through W.
For the enemy to be “fixed” in this case, he must be forced to employ more troops initially to insure security from the direction of B.
PROBLEM NO. 8
I’m the Prophet of the Utterly Absurd, Of the Patently Impossible and Vain— Kipling, “The Song of the Banjo.”
SITUATION.—An interior company is attacking north- ward. The enemy post at Y is being reduced by the com- pany on the right. The leading section of the 2d Platoon is held up on the forward slope of Hill B by the fire from a small enemy post at X to its front. The rear sec- tion is behind Hill B. The 1st Platoon has advanced up the wooded stream between the enemy combat posts. The rear section is closely following the leading section. The 3d Platoon is halted under cover. The troops are well- trained veterans.
REQUIREMENT.—(1) What are the intentions of the leader of the leading section, Ist Platoon? (2) The pla- toon leader Ist Platoon? (3) The platoon leader 2d Pla- toon? (4) The company commander? (5) If instead of being well-trained veterans, the troops are in their first fight, and have had little training, what are the in- tentions of the two assault platoon leaders and the com- pany commander?
j Yards 420
Q 100 — 300 MAP FoR PROBLEM N2 8
SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 8
(1) The section leader of the leading section 1st Pia- toon intends to continue the attack to the north, since he is being closely backed up or supported by friendly troops in rear.
(2) The platoon leader Ist Platoon, intends to leave a portion of the rear section on the small hill at A to keep the gap open and fire on X, and with the rest of the platoon to continue the advance to the north. This ad- vance will be for a limited distance only, unless other friendly troops follow the platoon. Forward platoons mak- ing a penetration should not press on so far as to get beyond supporting distance from the rest of the company. He notifies the company commander of the situation and of his actions.
(3) The platoon leader, 2d Platoon intends to send his rear section forward up the wooded ravine to attack the enemy post at X in flank and rear, assisted by his lead- ing section, capture it and widen the breach.
(4) The company commander intends to send the 3d Platoon under cover to the vicinity of A, and then move to the left and become the left assault platoon, leaving the 2d Platoon to reduce X, reorganize and become the com- pany support. The procedure described is termed in- filtration.
(5) With partly trained troops the lst Platoon leader would move his platoon to the vicinity of A from which he will keep open the gap and assist by fire in the attack on X. The 2d Platoon leader intends to use his rear sec- tion to attack X in flank and rear. The company com- mander intends to move the 3d Platoon forward along the covered approach to a position from which it can assist the attack on X, the company to resume its attack to the north after X is reduced and the company reorganized. Commanders of partly-trained troops should avoid dif- ficult maneuvers and pay particular attention to the matter of control.
PROBLEM NO. 9
For ’e might ’ave gone and sprayed ’em with a pompom Kipling “‘Stellenbosh”
SITUATION.—An interior battalion attacking north- ward, after initial progress, has been checked by enemy riflemen and machine guns on Hill A.
Assault companies of the battalion are pinned to the ground except that support platoons have not been used and are under cover of Hills B and C. Two platoons of
machine guns are firing from Hills B and C. The re- mainder of the machine-gun company, an attached can- non-company platoon and a rifle company in battalion re- serve have just reached the positions indicated on the sketch. The battalion on the right is abreast; that on the left in advance.
REQUIREMENT.—(1) Brief statement of how the battalion commander intends to continue the attack.
(2) If the assault companies have used their support platoons and all machine guns and cannon-company wea- pons are firing from Hills B and C, how does the bat- talion commander intend to continue the attack?
» Yards 1000
i 500
MAP FOR PROBLEM N29
SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 9
(1) The battalion commander intends to place his re- maining machine guns on the northwest part of Hill B and the cannon-company weapons in the vicinity of Hill C, and to direct the assault company commanders to use their support platoons and advance (that of the left company to move through woods north of B.)
There is no need for the battalion commander to use his reserve at this time; the utilization of the full fire power of the battalion, particularly the flanking fire effect of machine guns, should be sufficient to renew the ad- vance. Machine guns should be pushed forward into salients created by successful advances in order to get flanking fire on the enemy and assist the advance of adjacent troops. Maneuver elements still are at the dis- position of company commanders. The battalion cannot push forward past such serious resistance without re- ducing it, and it may take all of the battalion to do it.
(2) In the alternate situation the battalion commander renews the attack, employing the battalion reserve in a flanking movement through the woods north of B. In this case everything at the disposal of the battalion com- mander except his reserve has been used, and the bat- talion cannot get forward; the reserve should be used. The terrain and situation favor a flanking movement.
PROBLEM NO. 10
All delays are dangerous in war— Dryden, “Tyrannic Love”.
SITUATION.—Blues are attacking northward. The right assault company of a battalion, with two platoons in assault, is disposed as indicated. A large quarry with vertical sides has been discovered in front of the left assault platoon. A patrol has found the woods free of the enemy. Some fire is coming from B. Ground in front of the company is slightly rolling and covered with scattered underbrush.
One section of machine guns is firing from between the two assault platoons. The position of other machine guns or the battalion reserve is not known.
The company on the left has just taken the hill at C and is reorganizing.
A strong enemy counterattack starts from the left as indicated by arrows.
REQUIREMENT.—Action of right assault company commander: (1) if troops are well-trained veterans; (2) if troops are only partly trained; (3) if troops are partly trained and counterattack is led by tanks; (4) if troops are veterans and counterattack is led by tanks.
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 10
(1) The company commander moves his Ist Platoon around the quarry to the woods to take the counterat- tack in flank. He moves the support platoon (2d) by the shortest route to Hill C to fire on the counterattack. He uses the 3d Platoon for protection to the front, advancing it abreast of the woods.
(2) The left platoon and support platoon are both moved by the shortest route to Hill C to fire on the counterattack. The 3d Platoon advances abreast of the quarry for protection to the front and flank. This maneuver is simpler and easier of execution than that made by veterans. Moving under some fire first to the right, changing direction to the left, entry into the small woods, and taking security measures toward the north would require more time than with veterans, and greatly increase chances of confusion and disorganization. A simpler movement would be better even if it promises less decisive results.
(3) The company commander resumes the attack to- ward B, being hidden from view of tanks. He thus moves out of the path of the tanks, which he has no weapons to combat, and he attempts to parry the very strong danger of a tank panic by giving his men some- thing to do, by occupying their minds with the attack to- ward B. The tanks will have to be dealt with by some other agency.
(4) The company commander moves his company rap- idly into the woods W, where it has some protection against tanks, with a view of allowing the tanks to pass, and firing on the infantry following. Such a maneuver by partly trained troops would tend to result in great con- fusion; likewise it would be difficult to keep them from opening fire on the tanks, thereby leading the tanks to attack the wood. A small wood should not be considered a tank proof locality.
In either case (3) or (4) the essential thing is to give the men a definite task at once, which requires action by them and asserts control of the commander.
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PROBLEM NO. il
The bigger they come, the harder they fall. Bob Fitzsimmons.
SITUATION.—A brigade of infantry with a regiment of field artillery attached is marching eastward to secure the crossings at X. It has one battalion of infantry with a cannon-company pla- toon and a battery of artillery as advance guard.
As the advance guard reaches U the brigade commander unex- pectedly learns that an enemy force, strength unknown, has crossed at X and is deploying on the hills west thereof. It has artillery. The enemy apparently has advanced troops on Hills H and K but there is more activity on the hills east thereof.
Our hero firmly intends to attack. He instructs the advance guard (reinforced) to secure Hills H and K and to locate hostile flanks. He reinforces the advance guard to a strength of a regi- ment (less a battalion) and moves the artillery forward so it can support the advance-guard action. He moves the rest of his force into assembly areas in woods L and M.
The mission can only be carried out by aggressive action. True he does not know the exact strength of the enemy or where each hostile company is located. But the enemy does not seem superior; in fact the defensive attitude and the area occupied indicate in- feriority. Our leader has the offensive spirit and unless there is a lot of bad news he is going to attack. He is not particularly good at mathematics (numbers don’t mean so much to him) but he does know that small forces have frequently beaten larger ones. Maybe he is a lineal descendant of Old Man Gideon. (See Judges, vii).
Now the advance guard is about to secure Hills H and K. The main body is moving into assembly areas. The enemy has com- pleted deployment. No other enemy is reported near.
The troops are veterans. Combat orders are no mystery to them. The commander estimates that his troops can be up, and all nec- essary orders issued, so that with these veterans he can, if he de- sires, make a coordinated attack by 4:30 PM. Darkness will be at 6:45 PM. There are no good maps available.
REQUIREMENT.—(1) When does he attack? (2) Is the at- tack order written or oral? (3) Does it contain detailed instructions or is it in rather general terms? (4) If the troops are only partly trained, most of the officers have had little field service, and there are lots of good maps; what now is the answer to the above three questions?
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 11
(1) With veterans the attack is at 4:30 PM. There is only a short distance to go and success is possible be- fore darkness.
(2) The attack order is oral.
(3) It is general in character. Minute details with veterans are not necessary, there is not much time, and the lack of good maps makes detailed instructions almost impossible.
(4) With partly trained troops the issuance of orders, and conduct of the approach march with necessary se- curity precautions will be much slower. It is probable that a coordinated attack with everyone in place and knowing what he has to do cannot be launched until a considerable time after 4:30 PM. Indications are that the attack cannot be pushed to a successful conclusion to-day. Therefore the decision is made to attack at dawn, even at the cost of allowing the enemy to strength- en his position.
There is more time for orders, there are good maps, the troops are only partly trained and details which are unnecessary for veterans should be included in instruc- tions. All of these factors work for detailed, explicit orders. The brigade issues a written order. Orders to subordinate units are oral.
PROBLEM NO. 12
Fortune is not on the side of the faint-hearted— Sophocles.
Orders have been issued for the attack of the Blue bri- gade at 4:30 PM. Enemy troops hold hills B, C and D in force. The Blue advance guard holds hills H and K. The battalion on the south suffered rather heavily in taking K and is somewhat disorganized.
One regiment of infantry is in M, the remaining bat- talion of the regiment which furnished the advance guard is in L.
REQUIREMENT.—(1) Draw boundaries between regi- ments and assault battalions.
(2) State the size of the brigade reserve and the for- mation of each regiment.
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 12
(1) For boundaries see sketch.
(2) The northern regiment would attack with two bat- talions in assault and one (the one which was somewhat disorganized) in reserve. The southern regiment would attack in column of battalions, the last one being in bri- gade reserve.
The assault battalion of the south regiment making the envelopment, would advance initially in column of com- panies as the situation is somewhat obscure there, and it does not know where it will meet resistance. The bat- talion in regimental reserve would be echeloned on its southern flank.
Assault battalions to the north would each employ two rifle companies in assault.
The attack should be an envelopment of the southern flank. There is better cover there, and ridges are parallel to direction of attack.
It is desirable for the sake of simplicity for one regi- ment to make the secondary and the other make the en- veloping attack, and not have to attack any of the front of the enemy position. This is feasible in this situation.
Units of the new organization can be expected under average conditions to cover frontages as follows: (These are only approximate and are variable within wide limits in various situations).
Decisive Attack Secondary Attack
Squad 50 yards 75 yards Section 175 yards 200 yards Platoon 250 yards 400 yards Company 500 yards 800 yards Battalion 1000 yards 1600 yards Regiment 2000 yards 3200 yards
Exceeding the figures indicated in the case of partly trained troops will tend to be somewhat exceptional, since wide frontages do not favor control. Boundaries between infantry units, to be of value, must be some- thing more than mere lines on a map. They must be readily recognizable by troops on the ground.
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PROBLEM NO. 13
Extreme remedies are very appropriate for extreme diseases—
Hippocrates.
SITUATION.—Blue troops are detraining 25 miles east of the woods shown in the sketch. Detachments have been pushed forward to the stream to cover detrainment. An enemy is advancing from the west.
A Blue regiment of veterans at war strength was or- dered to prevent a crossing in the vicinity of A. De- tachments from another division guard crossings to the north, and cavalry those to the south, where a strong hostile effort is not expected.
A hostile crossing at A early to-day drove back the defenders. In the afternoon the regimental reserve made a successful surprise attack on the enemy’s northern flank. At 5:00 PM the enemy was still resisting but was being driven back toward A in confusion. A partly trained Blue regiment at peace strength is attached to the veteran Blue regiment and has just reached the hills near D.
At 5:00 PM the commander of the Blues near A learns that strong enemy forces have crossed the stream to the northeast and overrun the defenders and peretrated deeply. They are still advancing. As fast as additional Blue troops detrain, they are being moved toward B. All available Blue troops near B, some seven or eight battalions, will attack at dawn from the general position shown on the sketch in an effort to stop hostile progress and allow detrainment to continue.
The cavalry on the south after successful resistance up to noon was driven back by a hostile crossing at C. The situation is obscure but the cavalry still resists. The sketch indicates the situation at 5:00 PM.
At 5:00 PM the Blue regimental commander submitted to his superiors a recommendation for future operations of the force under his command.
REQUIREMENT.—The recommendation. How would this be affected if all the Blue troops were only partly trained?
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 13
The Blue regimental commander recommends that the veteran regiment be withdrawn under cover of darkness, and moved by night to the woods southwest of B with a view to making a surprise attack on the enemy to the north at dawn or operating against his rear. The peace strength regiment to take over security missions to the west and southwest.
The Blue regimental commander believes in the offen- sive and in maneuver. He reasons that Blue success at A now has almost no bearing on operations as a whole and that the threat near C will be slow materializing. The decisive fight will be near B. He desires to assist the Blue effort there to the utmost.
With veterans he considers it practicable to withdraw the troops now in contact with the enemy, under cover of darkness, march several miles at night, and prepare to attack in still another direction soon after daylight. This puts the stronger regiment in the decisive fight, leaving the simpler holding mission to the partly trained troops.
With all troops partly trained, a simpler maneuver is advisable. The peace strength regiment is turned over to the commander of troops at B; the war strength regi- ment withdraws to the 5:00 PM position of the peace strength regiment under cover of darkness and provides security. Depending on the situation portions may be available later to-morrow to assist the operations near B.
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PROBLEM NO. 14
And what did ye look they should compass? Warcraft learned in a breath? Kipling, “The Islanders.”
SITUATION.—A Blue force has the mission of pre- venting enemy troops from moving southeast through the Pass A.
One Blue battalion on Hills B, C and D was attacked this morning by an enemy force and driven back. An additional Blue battalion arrived this afternoon and the Blues attacked.
At 6:00 PM the attack was slowly progressing. The Ist Battalion, somewhat disorganized and at about 60 per cent effective strength, is generally east of the road. The 2d Battalion is to the west.
A third battalion has arrived at the locality shown. Some officers of this battalion have preceded the battalion and are familiar with the terrain. Darkness is at 7:00 PM. Additional enemy troops, marching toward A, went into bivouac at 5:00 PM, 17 miles northwest of A.
(1) All Blue battalions are well-trained veterans.
(2) Two Blue battalions are well-trained veterans; the last battalion to arrive is only partly trained.
(3) All of the Blues have had very little training.
REQUIREMENT.—What does the Blue commander in- tend to do in each case?
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 14
(1) The Blue commander will reorganize, use the newly- arrived battalion to relieve the 1st Battalion, and make a night attack, about 11:00 PM, one battalion on each side of the road, with the lst Battalion in reserve, to. capture Hills B, C and D before the arrival of hostile reinforce- ments, which seems probable early to-morrow.
(2) The Blue commander will reorganize, and make a night attack, keeping the partly-trained battalion as reserve.
(3) With all troops partly trained, the Blue commander will reorganize during the night with the intention of re- suming the attack at dawn.
Night attacks are frequently an indication of decisive leadership, which regardless of difficulties, strives to maintain the initiative and carry an action to a success- ful conclusion.
All night attacks are hazardous, and are particularly so with troops having had little training in such oper- ations. In this case a night attack by partly trained troops might scatter the enemy. It is more probable that it would scatter your own troops.
An attack at dawn has fair chances of success, since if the enemy reinforcements are given several hours rest, as is probable, they will not arrive until some time af- ter dawn.
If you pulled off a night attack in Case 3, well, we are a bit skeptical, but won’t quarrel with you too much about it. It’s aggressive, and if your subordinate com- manders thought they could do it, maybe it would work. But an earnest prayer by the commander would not be inadvisable.
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PROBLEM NO. 15
You may hide in the caves, they'll be only your graves, but you can’t get away from the guns— Kipling, “Serew Guns.”
SITUATION.—A Blue regiment, an interior unit, is to attack southward. Advance elements, prior to the attack, have reached the railroad in close contact with the enemy.
The eastern portion of the zone of action is wooded, rugged, broken and traversed by streams. The western portion is more open but contains some cover for ad- vancing infantry.
(1) The Blues are well-trained veterans, supported by one battalion of light artillery, but no tanks.
(2) The Blues are partly-trained troops in their first action, led by recently commissioned officers for the most part. A company of tanks is attached to the regiment, and supporting artillery behind it is lined up almost hub to hub. Blue artillery and aviation are considerably superior to the Reds.
REQUIREMENT.—Where does the regiment make its main effort in each case?
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 15
(1) In the first case the veterans will make their main effort in the eastern portion of the zone of action. There is much better cover for the infantry there.
(2) In the second case the partly-trained troops will make their main effort in the western part of the zone. The reasons are: (1) contro] of the troops in the eastern part of the zone will be difficult, supporting machine-gun and howitzer fire relatively difficult, and loss of direction by partly-trained troops after the attack has progressed some distance is probable; (2) the terrain does not lend itself to the infantry receiving good artillery support; (3) the terrain is not very suitable for tanks.
All of these considerations work against a main effort in the eastern part of the zone.
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PROBLEM NO. 16
The ancient days come back no more than water under a bridge
But the bridge it stands and the water runs as red as yesterday—
Kipling, “The Irish Guards.”
SITUATION.—A battalion with a platoon of tanks at- tached is attacking southward in the western portion of the regimental] zone shown in the preceding problem. The line of departure is the railroad. The enemy holds the hill south of the railroad strongly.
REQUIREMENT .—Location of the tanks twelve min- utes before the hour of attack, and at H hour.
ALTERNATE REQUIREMENT.—The situation is the same except that the enemy is known to hold the hill just south of the railroad very lightly, and is strongly organized on the hill 1300 yards south of the road. What is the location of the tanks with respect to the battalion at the start of the attack?
SECOND REQUIREMENT.—A platoon of tanks is at- tached to a battalion attacking in the eastern part of the regimental zone. The enemy holds the high ground just south of the railroad. How are the tanks employed at the start of the attack? Later?
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SOLUTION TO PROBLEM NO. 16
The tanks attached to the battalion on the west in the case where strong resistance will be encountered early should cross the railroad ahead of the riflemen and go ahead to reduce resistance on the hill. At H hour they should be 100 to 200 yards ahead of the riflemen. At twelve minutes before H they should be leaving the sou- thern edge of the wood 600 yards north of the railroad.
In the second case where the enemy at first will not offer serious resistance, the tanks will be held in reserve initially.
Tanks attached to the battalion on the east in the second requirement precede the riflemen, reduce resis- tance on the high ground immediately south. of the rail- road, and then rally and withdraw into reserve. Their later employment depends on where hostile resistance is encountered, and their ability to reach it, either through the zone of the battalion or by a detour to the west.
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——
CHAPTER IV DEFENSE BY SMALL INFANTRY UNITS
Scene: Office of an instructor, The Infantry School— (instructor seated at his desk).
Time: November, 1930 (Enter Colonel X, an instructor on duty with the Organized Reserves.)
Colonel X: What’s all this about a new defense you fellows here at Benning are putting out? One of my officers came back and told me you people didn’t give lines or limiting points; didn’t use terms like strong- points and centers of resistance, but talked a lot about areas. He told me about a field exercise you had where he couldn’t pick out any lines; that very few riflemen were in position, and even the front-line platoons had some reserves. He also said that practically all the reserves of rifle units and even some machine guns were behind hills and in woods where they were prepared to move this way or that. He was quite enthusiastic about it el], but I can’t find it covered in any manuals.
Instructor: Sit down, Colonel, and I'll give you the “dope.” First of all, let me explain that here at Ben- ning we are dealing with small infantry units from the brigade down, principally the battalion, and are trying to prepare for the first phase of the next war. This phese will undoubtedly be open warfare and in it we will have only partially trained troops and comparatively inexperienced officers. We feel that this is the most difficult form of warfare for regimental officers and that our methods must be simple, practicable, and easy to understand. Most of the previous studies on the defen- sive action of small units have involved more of position than -mobile warfare and have followed closely the methods appropriate for divisional and corps units. They have leaned heavily on the technique of field fortifica- tions.
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Now, let’s start with your first point,—lines. Present texts state that each commander should prescribe a number of lines for his subordinates; for instance, the battalion commander is given or prescribes the main line of resistance, the support line, and the battalion re- serve line. You know that we have been fighting the line complex for a long time. No matter how much we told the student that the positions of groups on the ground finally determined the line, it didn’t seem to get across. His tendency was to place his troops in more or less linear formations along these defined lines, resulting in overcrowding and not taking advantage of the terrain. Often there would be localities between the lines which should have been but which were not even considered. By giving a commander an area to defend rather than one or more lines, we believe we overcome this.
Coionel X: That seems O.K., but how do you designate these areas without using lines?
Instructor: There are several ways of doing that. You can assign an area by designating points or localities on its perimeter; you can divide your area by giving the subordinates their forward and rear limits and a boundary between them; or you can designate an area by giving the forward slopes of a ridge, a hill, a woods, or some other terrain feature. We don’t prescribe any specific method.
Colonel X: When you give forward and rear limits, say for a battalion, aren’t you really giving the main line of resistance and the battalion reserve line?
Instructor: Sure we are, but by not calling them lines we get the results we are after.
Colonel X: I see. Then if I wanted to give an area to a front-line company instead of giving the main line of resistance and support line, I should pick these out anc call them front and rear limits of the company area.
Instructor: That’s about right. Actually you should give as the rear boundary the rear of the localities which
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would be crganized on the support line rather than the line itself which is determined by the front of these localities. You see this really isn’t any great change. The main purpose is to emphasize the defense of reas rather than lines. By so doing, we get a defense based more nearly on the ground.
Colonel X: How far down do you go? Would you give a squad an area?
Instructor: We go down to include platoons. It seems that sections and squads must be given positions to occupy.
Colonel X: I see, but how do you coordinate without lines and jimiting points?
Instructor: Often the ground makes directions as to
coordination unnecessary. When this is not the case, the higher commander directs his subordinates to coor- dinate at certain localities. You see we really have what
you might call limiting points but we don’t use this term which nearly always confuses the officers concerned.
Colonel X: That’s right. I never could define one Instructor: Just for the same reason we use “com- ,
pany or battalion areas” rather than “strongpoints” or “centers of resistance.”
Colonel X: Looks to me like common sense. If you keep on we won’t have to have a glossary in front of everv military text. Now tell me about these reserves,— how do you get them, what are they for, and what do they actually do?
lustructor: Well, we get them in the first place by putting into firing positions only those riflemen and auto- matic riflemen whose use can clearly be foreseen. These sma)! groups have several missions,—such as supplement- ing the fire of machine guns, protecting machine zuns and keeping them in action, and meeting assaults of the enemy. On some parts of the front comparatively few rifemen and automatic-riflemen are needed. On other
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parts little effective machine-gun fire can be brought to bear and more rifles and automatic rifles are necessary. Generally a front-line platoon can hold out a reserve varying in size from a squad to a section. Likewise companies, hattalions, and regiments hold out reserves. The reserves of platoons are generally used to strengthen threatened points, to replace machine-gun crews, to eject sm:.1l1 enemy groups which have worked into the area, and, as far as practicable, to replace the fire of machine guns if they are knocked out. The company reserve, which we call a support, has a general mission of de- fending the rear of the company area and of ejecting small penetrations by counterattack. To defend the rear area, this support selects and organizes several positions which, if held, will limit or check enemy success. It is then held mobile, ready to counterattack or to occupy one or more of these selected positions as the necessity arises.
Colonel X: Doesn’t the company support always counterattack if the enemy penetrates the company sector?
Instructor: No, the company commander must use jucgment. He should counterattack if the situation promises a reasonable chance of success, otherwise he shculd hold and endeavor to check the enemy until reserves of higher units can take coordinated action. If the support does counterattack, it should strike immedi- ately and from the position in which it is located. Usually there would be no opportunity for maneuver or careful preparation. If delay is necessary a counter- attack by the support would generally be inadvisable.
Now as to the reserves of battalions and regiments. Their action is similar to that of the company support except that counterattacks by these reserves are to be carefully prepared and coordinated, especially as _ to supporting fires.
You notice that all of these reserves are initially held mobile and not committed to any position or line of action until the necessity arises.
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Colonel X: How about machine guns in reserve? Instructor: Only those machine guns which fire effec- tively in front of the position are initially placed in firing positions. Often there will be machine guns in battalion anJ regimental reserve for which there will be several positions selected, but none occupied until the necessity arises, the guns being held mobile under cover until that time comes.
Colonel X: It seems to me that sufficient rifle and automatic riflemen would be provided by holding the front of the battalion area with one rifle company and keeping two in reserve. Is that your usual distribution, or do you stick to the old two in front and one in reserve?
Instructor: When a battalion is acting as part of a larger force, we generally follow the latter procedure. You are right as to the number required, but there are several objections to putting one company over a 1600- yard front which we figure is about the average for a ba‘talion to defend. The company commander would have a difficult time getting his company on the position; it would have to be disposed without depth, practically on a line, control would be impossible, and those small groups which we consider desirable in rear of the for- ward groups would be missing. All counterattacks would have to be delivered by battalion reserves. A reinforce- ment of forward groups, such as would be necessary to meet threatened assaults or at night, would cause a serious mixing of units. This distribution might be advisable if the forward area was such that any move- ment in it was looked on as impracticable. Even then, I believe for the purpose of control it would be better to have two companies disposed in depth in the forward area.
Colonel X: You seem to place a lot of faith in your machine guns; in fact you appear to be basing your defense on them. Is that correct?
Instructor: Yes, Sir. We teach that when time and terrain permit, the defense is built up around the ma- chine guns.
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Colonel X: How do you do that? Must the rifle units wait until the machine guns are in position, and, if so, won’t that require a lot of time?
Instructor: Consider a meeting engagement where time is very important. We believe that the last combat elements of the force should be kept marching onto the Position. We also teach that often the defending force will not go through assembly areas but will issue extra ammunition on the position. Even under these conditions we believe that we can base our defense on the machine guns, the terrain permitting. We do this by having the commanders precede their troops, making only the absolutely necessary reconnaissances and issuing brief, simple orders stripped to the essentials. If the battalion commander will take his machine-gun company com- mander on reconnaissance with him, by the time the reconnaissance is finished the latter officer should know the plan of the battalion commander. If the battalion commander will then release the machine-gun comnany commander and not require him to stay and listen to the battalion order, the machine-gun company commander can issue his order at once. This enables his lieutenants to inform the rifle-unit commanders of the location of the machine guns and their fires before the rifle-company corsmanders are ready to issue their orders. We also stress the point that there must be cooperation. In fact, we don’t have any tactical problems solely for rifle units or for machine-gun units. Each must always consider the other.
Colonel X: That sounds good, but does it work?
Instructor: We have tried it out with the 29th In- fantry in field exercises and maneuvers, and it has worked satisfactorily. We believe it will work if the bat‘alion commander does everything in his power to get early information of his plan to his machine-gun company commander and then releases him to execute his part of the plan. We make it a responsibility of the machine gunners to inform the rifle-unit commanders of their gun positions and fires.
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Colonel X: Guess that’s what I wanted. Off hand, it seems to me that we who are not at your school should know what you are teaching. My books which I have to use as texts convey somewhat different ideas. They seem to contemplate a tight defense with evervthineg in position, and you appear to be teaching a rather loose defense with a large proportion mobile. How are we to keep up to date?
Instructor: Well, if there is progress there must be change. The methods which we have been discussing have been under study and experiment for several vears. but it was not advisable to publish them until they were ratner thoroughly tested. They will probably appear in the Infantry Field Manual, on which we are now work- ine. As a matter of fact, there has not been so much a change in method as there has been a change in the tac*ical situation under consideration, and an effort to attain genuine simplicity. I have been talking about open wartare, the initial phases of a campaign, and with methods we believe suitable for small units of an Ameri- can war army. I think too often the company and bat- talion defense problems have been considered on a basis closely approaching position warfare and solved by methods more suitable for large and distinctly veteran units.
Our mailing list should keep you up to date. Our faculty is always glad to answer any questions. When you get back, if you have overlooked anything, write me and I’ll be glad to send you our “dope.”
CHAPTER V
“FOOD FOR THE GUNS” OR THE WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW OF AMMUNITION SUPPLY
Darkness having just closed in to cover the movement, and all preliminary daylight arrangements having been made, the brigade was promptly set in motion for the long forced march to secure the crossing of Blood River to the west. Careful estimate by its commander made certain that such a movement would surprise the enemy and two hours after daylight the brigade would be safely on the west bank and in secure possession of that im- portant point.
At midnight the Colonel of the Ist Infantry, marching at the head of his regiment in the main body, was con- versing with his staff concerning the probable develop- ments of the day. Since combat is probable he has in his staff group his S-4 and the munitions officer.
We are present as observers.
Checking up his combat means he finds that his sup- ply agencies are somewhat scattered. The field train under the regimental supply officer is carrying his regimental baggage and rolling reserve of rations and is marching at the tail of the brigade. His kitchen train, under the senior lieutenant, is just ahead of the field train. Both are under brigade control, at least five miles in rear and possibly still in bivouac. These trains, he realizes, have been placed in rear by brigade in order to zacilitate his entry into action and because they will not be needed for some time after contact is gained. This action by the brigade commander placing the in- fantry trains in the rear has saved approximately 2.000 yards of road space for the combat elements and placed them that much closer to the probable point of con- tact. He highly approves of this arrangement since he realizes that his supply officer is back there to control
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them and send vehicles forward as needed. He knows that his combat trains, with the exception of the kitchen vehicles, are split up in the column with battalion and headquarters sections marching right in rear of their units, as is habitual, in order that they may promptly make available the additional munitions needed to initiate combat. He is well satisfied that his troops and supplies needed for prompt entry into action are well disposed.
Suddenly, just as the first ray of daylight is noted, much to our surprise, we hear firing ahead and shortly thereafter the Colonel receives a message to ride forward to receive orders for an attack. Apparently the enemy is doing the surprising this morning.
Very soon the executive who was left in charge of the regiment is directed to march it to a designated assembly area under cover of the woods on the near side of the hill on our right front. The executive, being well trained and realizing the importance of time, directs battalions
to issue extra ammunition in their assembly areas while commanders are making their reconnaissances, receiving and issuing orders for the attack.
As the regiment leaves the road, let us go with the Ist Battalion into its assembly area. Here we see the men of Company A already dropping their rolls preparatory to drawing extra ammunition to carry into action. The battalion executive, realizes that the ammunition on the men, 40 rounds in the belt of each rifleman and 60 rounds in the three magazines of each automatic rifleman, though enough for an emergency on the march, is not enough to carry them through an attack. He has ordered that the loads of the three rifle company wagons of the combat train be issued. On the combat wagon of Com- pany A are carried 60 rounds (1 bandoleer) per rifle and 540 rounds (27 magazines) per automatic rifle and in addition, a supply of pistol ammunition and hand and rifle grenades both smoke and tear-gas. As A Company’s wagon moves up, the armorer and the assistant wagoner prepare for issue. Boxes are opened and ammunition dumped in piles and the men file by and pick up their loads. We note off to the right and rear that B and C
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Companies are going through the same procedure. In about 30 minutes the whole operation is completed.
When the captain of Company A is ready to take up the approach march we observe that each soldier has on his back: his haversack with his cooked lunch, his reserve ration and toilet articles. To satisfy our curiosity concerning the load carried by the doughboy in action, we check the distribution of the ammunition carried in each squad:
Corporal and four riflemen (each) :
40 rounds rifle ammunition in belt
60 rounds rifle ammunition in bandoleer
160 rounds automatic rifle ammunition in 8 maga- zines
2d in Command:
5 or 6 grenades 40 rounds rifle ammunition in belt 60 rounds rifle ammunition in bandoleer
Two automatic riflemen (each):
200 rounds automatic rifle ammunition in 10 maga- zines.
After this check we are convinced that the soldier must drop his roll before picking up his combat load if he is to operate efficiently in battle. Even then the weight carried appears to be excessive.
Captain of Company A explains that he will leave the rolls under a guard of one man and depart with a prayer in his heart that the regiment will arrange to get them up to him by night.
Seeing S-4 of the lst Battalion in the assembly area we discuss with him his duties. He informs us that he will notify S-4 of the regiment of the location of the rolls so that he can arrange to forward them. He points out the battalion ammunition distributing point on the unimproved road just to our rear.
S-4 is about to go forward to join his battalion com- mander to learn the details of the tactical plan and the regimental supply plan on which to base future supply operation. While moving forward he observes the terrain and condition of the roads in order to be prepared for
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forward movement in close contact with the troops as they advance. Before leaving he introduces us to his battalion supply officer, a young lieutenant from the service company, who in combat assists S-4 as battalion supply officer. He is now gathering the empty wagons of Companies A, B, and C and explains that they will go back at once to the road junction, a few hundred yards to our left rear, which the regimental commander has just designated as regimental ammunition distributing point. There the regimental munitions officer will take control and supervise their refilling back at the brigade ammunition distributing point.
In answer to our questions concerning requisitions and other supply red tape the Lieutenant states that in com- bat the empty wagons are in themselves a requisition and will be refilled and returned to the battalion ammunition distributing point at once. The battalion supply officer in turn is responsible for operating his own unit distribu- ting point and for fulfilling the needs of the companies as they are made known. Again in answer to our many questions concerning the practical problems of suvply in action he explains: “Suppose Company A in the attack needs more ammunition. Its captain sends a request to the battalion ammunition distributing point with a runner to act as guide. The battalion either has a loaded wagon ready or it sends for one to the regimental dis- triouting point. It is then my duty to send ammunition forward to the company either by wagon, if the situation permits, or as is more usual, by carrying parties from the battalion reserve. Of course S-4 must arrange with the battalion commander for the use of troops for this pur- pose.”
The supply officer then takes us to the battalion am- munition distributing point where we see 5 more combat wagons; one headquarters, one medical, two with ma- chine-gun ammunition for Company D and one with cannon company ammunition for the attached cannon platoon. Since the company carts were loaded on the march no extra ammunition can be issued to the gun or ammunition carts of those companies. He again very
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kindly explains that the machine-gun and cannon pla- toon carts will return, when empty, to the battalion am- munition distributing point for refill and that the dis- tributing point must be advanced along an announced axis as the attack progresses, so that units will always know just where to send their empty carts or other re- quests for ammunition. S-4, when he knows the tactical plan, will announce that axis to the command.
When the tactical plan is known the one medical wagon will be moved at once, under control of the surgeon, to the aid station, dump its equipment and be placed under cover nearby.
The headquarters wagon, we discover, carries the command post equipment to the initial location of the command post as soon as that is known and then moves to cover nearby. Since it contains one extra bandoleer for each rifleman of Companies A, B, and C, it is ready on call to distribute to them. This could have been distributed in the assembly area, but S-4 considered one bandoleer sufficient.
Leaving the lst Battalion area, well satisfied with our observation, we move back along the road a short distance with the empty combat wagons to the regimental ammuni- tion distributing point where the regimental munitions officer was assembling empty wagons of other units preparatory to dispatching them to the rear to be re- filled.
Having gained some first-hand information concerning the methods and difficulties involved in “feeding the guns” we move on back to the field and kitchen trains to find the answer to the oft repeated question, “When Do We Eat?”
NOTE.—The next issue of the Mailing List will in- clude in narrative form a story entitled “When Do We Eat?” a discussion of class-1 supply in the regiment. For those interested, some concrete supply problems based on map situations have been prepared and will be supplied on request to those interested in furthering their knowledge of supply in campaign.
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CHAPTER VI “CLIPPED WINGS”
NOTE.—A narrative of the antiaircraft defense of an in- fantry battalion based on the present methods and wea-
pons used by the infantry and the correct tactics of at- tack aviation.
The battalion operations officer entered the shack on the edge of the woods where battalion headquarters had been set up just before dawn.
“Well,” exclaimed the Executive, “what is the result?”
“Everything seems to be O.K., sir,” replied S-3. “The woods are thick enough to furnish overhead cover if the men do not wander around the edge—and I don’t think they will, for they seem rather anxious to rest after last night’s march. I inspected the entire area and found the companies well dispersed, but we can communicate with any of them in a few minutes if anything turns up. For antiaircraft protection, each rifle outfit has two squads concealed outside the woods and the machine-gun com- pany has eight guns in position. I ordered them to cam- ouflage their dispositions, although really I don’t see much reason for it as we are three days’ march from the front.”
“Three days’ march,” interrupted the Executive. “That is less than an half-hour jump for those air boys. They have pushed the chances for a fight over 150 miles back of the old front lines and we are lucky not to have had a visit from them before now. This war is still young and the Red air men will be looking for a chance to prove that ground movements are a thing of the past. However, let them try it, I’m not worried about the result. But what changes in dispositions did you make?
The operations officer continued, hoping to make an impression on the Executive, an officer of considerable ex- perience who had seen service in France in 1918: “The railroad running towards the front is a short distance away, and about a mile north of here there is a spur
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track to the southeast. With the exception of the main road this spur seems to be the only conspicuous land mark the Red aviation might use in operating in this re- gion. I placed two of the rifle squads and two machine- gun sections half way between the spur and our patch of woods, so if planes come from that direction they will get a warm reception. The remainder of the squads and guns are distributed around the other sides of the woods and far enough out to bring their fire to bear over the trees. Also, I ordered our tracks leading into the woods this morning, covered over.”
“That’s fine, Captain,” replied the Executive, and turn- ing to S-1 continued, “Jones, it would be a good idea to caution company commanders to wait until dark before lighting any fires. Most of them are new at this business. While you are out, please arrange for some one to control the parade of officers and runners coming in here, other- wise we will have a highway worked to our front door and an ambitious young Red might drop us a card.”
“Major,” S-3 was again addressing the Executive, “why was it during the last war no attempt was made to shoot down hostile planes? From all I’ve heard, it seems that the infantry ran from the bombs and machine-gun bullets and made no special effort to fight back.”
“That is partly true,” answered the Major. “A few hardy souls did return the fire and a few enemy planes were brought down by the infantry, but you must remem- ber that we knew very little about aviation and next to nothing about antiaircraft work. Some men had never seen an airplane until they reached France. Probably a number of men in this battalion have flown and there are few who have not watched planes flying over their heads. Aviation has developed rapidly, but so has our knowledge of antiaircraft defense, and although I hope we won't have to prove it, I am certain this battalion will fully justify its short course in antiaircraft training if the Red air force is willing to take a chance. But we won’t be able to justify anything if we don’t get a little rest and I’m about to start resting.”
After a night of marching, it was not long before quiet settled over the command post, interrupted only by an
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occasional messenger or officer whose business was soon taken care of.
Late in the same afternoon the command post showed signs of activity. Preparations were under way to resume the march at dark and the operations officer had just come in from a motor reconnaissance of the route the battalion was to take, when the battalion commander en- tered the shack and without any preliminaries directed the Executive to cancel the march preparations and assemble the staff and company commanders immediately.
Runners were quickly dispatched for the company com- manders, and in a short time all were assembled, curious to learn what had occurred at regimental headquarters.
“Gentlemen,” began the battalion commander, “I have some good and also some bad news. In the first place we are to have a rest; we remain in our present bivouac tonight and do not march until dawn to-morrow. Army truck trains and artillery have the use of our roads to- night. Now for the part that is not so good. We are to make day-light marches. The corps has sent out a general antiaircraft warning, as the Red attack aviation appears to be making an effort to prevent troops and supplies from getting forward. Yesterday they seriously damaged one of our infantry outfits fifteen miles north of here. This unit was marching through an area containing a number of supply depots heavily protected hy antiaircraft units. There were several airdromes in the vicinity. Red pursuit units appeared and our planes took off and at- tacked them, but apparently at some distance away from the marching column. While this was in progress enemy attack planes slipped in, struck our infantry, and did con- siderable damage. The principal losses were in the trains and in the machine-gun companies, but I understand it was more than an hour before the units resumed the march. Investigation showed that the infantry had de- pended entirely on the regular antiaircraft troops to fur- nish protection, but those people were disposed to pro- tect a wide area, principally against high-flying bombers. Gentlemen, we alone are responsible for our own pro- tection against low-flying planes.
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“To-morrow we are the leading battalion of the regi- ment,” he continued, “and will march on one road, in the usual antiaircraft formation with normal march dis- tances. The regiment is sending an officer and four mounted men, to precede the column at one thousand yards. They will fire if an attack is threatened from the front.”
“The Red aviation attack group consists of three planes flying low and abreast. To-night, and again before the march in the morning, company commanders will go over with their companies the instructions, signals, etc., we have arranged for this situation. The battalion will de- ploy to resist air attack upon the firing of a red rocket from the head or tail of the column.
“The combat train, less the kitchen sections, will march at the tail of the column. The combined kitchen sections under brigade contro] will march with the field trains.
“1 will be at the head of the column.
“Any questions? That is all.”
Sunrise found the battalion on the march. The road passed through a gently rolling country, fairly open, with occasional patches of woods.
The march formation of the battalion was well de- signed for protection against hostile aviation. Rifle pla- toons were in line of section columns with rifles loaded, locked, and slung over the shoulder. A machine-gun pla- toon marched immediately in rear of each rifle company and the fourth platoon followed the combat train. The guns, on Matthews mounts, were half loaded and their muzzles pointed skywards.
Two mounted orderlies rode far out on each flank, moving from hill to hill. They carried Very pistols with green light cartridges to give early warning of approach- ing planes. Two men in each company were charged with the resnonsibility of watchin these outriders for signals.
An officer with an automatic pistol with tracers march- ed at the head, and another, similarly equipped, marched at the tail of the column. These two officers were charg- ed with the responsibility of giving the signal for im- mediate deployment to meet an attack. With each rode
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a mounted orderly whose special function was to watch the airguards for signals.
Within the companies each rifle platoon and machine- gun squad had been carefully instructed as to which plane it would fire at in case of an attack by three-plane for- mation and two-plane formation. The system of secur- ing fire distribution within the rifle companies was one in which they had received training. Regardless of the direction of the attack, the leading, middle, and rear platoons were to fire on the right, center, and left planes respectively.
Within the rifle platoons, varying target lead lengths were assigned to the several squads to insure further dis- tribution of fire.
From daylight on, planes flving at high altitudes were observed but whether these planes were friendly or hos- tile could not be determined.
Suddenly, out of the eastern sky and from the rear, came a plane flying somewhat lower than those which had preceded it. Rifles were unslung, and the battalion grew silent. Circling high over the marching column, well out of range, the plane fired a green-light signal and going into a dive passed over the head of the column, dropping a message, which was evidently intended for the brigade commander, who was riding ahead. As the signal light was fired, the shouts of “Friendly airplane” could be heard all along the line.
“Well, Major,” said the operations officer, “maybe the Red attack planes won’t fly our way to-day.”
“Well,” replied the Major, “attack planes don’t cruise around looking for targets. That procedure would be too costly. If an attack is planned it is almost certain that observation planes have previously spotted us and that the attack planes will strike at the time and place most favorable to them and unfavorable for us. The plans of the aviation are generally based on more complete infor- mation than many of ours in ground fights.
“I was somewhat worried,” continued the Executive, “when that dispatch plane came over. It looked for a moment as if the battalion were going to leave the road.
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If we jump off and on the road every time a plane flies over, the Reds won’t have to attack. We will be making the delay for them, and will never get anywhere.”
It was a clear winter morning, and about 8:00 o’clock with the sun at its back, the battalion had settled down to the real serious business of marching. A half mile behind the combat train lay an unusually large patch of woods through which the command had just passed.
Suddenly the comparative quiet was broken by a low drone which suddenly increased to a roar. Some shout- ing was heard to the rear, a green signal light was fired by the left-flank airguard and a moment later red signal lights flashed from the head and rear of the column.
There was no question of mistaken identity. Flying close to the tree tops, just a little south of where the road emerged from the woods, appeared three Red planes. Tiny spurts of flame could be distinguished on the wings and throuch the propellers, and above the roar of the motors the intermittent whine of bullets could be heard.
The battalion deployed at a run. Rifle sections cleared the road. Squads dispersed in irregular formations, in- dividuals finally moving to such cover as was immediately available. Some men continued running, but the ma- jority turned and fired at the on-coming planes. By the time the last rifleman had cleared the road, the machine guns opened fire. The planes were over the tail of the column before fire on them was opened. They rushed on, their outlines growing larger every second, and the firing of the rifles and machine guns rose to a roar. The plane flying to the left of the road suddenly veered and crashed in a cloud of dust in the adjacent field. “One down” shouted a machine gunner from the platoon at the tail of the column.
The other two planes came on, bombs commenced to drop, the center plane landing one apparently in the middle of the combat train. Suddenly a flash of fire burst from its side. Trailing a long plume of smoke, it swerved to the right and disappeared over a ridge.
The remaining plane dashed over the column, scream- ing with the mad speed of its flight and dropping its
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|
bombs, ten in all, and spraying a rain of steel fragments from the right of the combat train up to the leading rifle- men, now almost buried in the ground and hoping for a dud from this last Red aviator.
As the bombs commenced to fall the ground fire dimin- ished, but a few riflemen and most of the machine gun- ners continued firing. Men armed with the pistol, not to be outdone, did a little shooting on their own.
Almost before the noise of the departing plane had died away, the bugle was sounding, “Forward March.” Section and squad leaders were giving commands and the battalion resumed its movement to the west. Deployed in squad columns, and marching off the road, it micht have been passing through artillery fire judging bv the formation. All were disposed to meet another attack im- mediately following the first.
The battalion medical detachment spread over the scene of the combat, dressing wounded and getting them to the side of the road to be evacuated. Several men, bleeding from small wounds, were moving forwar’ with their squads. These were walking cases, not disabled to the extent that they must leave their organizations.
Three of the combat wagons and some machine-gun carts seemed to be delaying their resumption of the march.
“S-1,” instructed the battalion commander, “remain here to get me a report of casualties when the surgeon has checked them off.”
“S-3,” he continued, “get me a report of the ammuni- tion expended. I want to know how much we used. Tell S-4 to stand by his disabled transportation until it is started, ‘hat is, such of it thet ean be moved.”
Ten minutes later, no more Red aviation being observed, the bugle sounded “Assembly” and the battalion returned to the road and its original formation, continuing its march to the west.
Along the column the talk was now about as rapid as the firing had been a few minutes before. Comments were heard as to how many hits this or that one had made, how it compared with bird shooting, how big the birds were this time and the humorous comments common to a group
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of soldiers. One veteran remarked that at least you could see the airplanes, which was better than being shot at by hidden machine guns or moving through gassed areas, and he didn’t think it was any worse than artillery shelling with which they would all be familiar before long.
“Did you see Brown get his?,” asked one soldier. “He kept right on going, made no attempt to get in a hole or to fire. He didn’t stop until he was hit. I don’t know whether it was a bullet or one of those bombs that got him but he should have known better. The Captain told us many times, you can’t run away from one of these at- tacks, you had much better shoot back. I did, and I’ll bet I left a mark on that last fellow.”
“How much time do you think we lost during the show ?,” asked the battalion commander.
“Not much!,” replied the Executive, “those ships were coming over better than one hundred and fifty miles an hour, and the whole thing was over in a half minute. We lost a little by marching across country for a few minutes, but I believe that was the safest move.”
Fifteen minutes later, the adjutant and the operations officer rode up to the head of the column.
“Sir,” reported the adjutant, “I’m sorry to say we had twenty-nine men wounded who will require evacuation, and eight men killed. We lost six mules, and one wagon had a wheel blown off, in addition to some minor dam- ages to other wagons and carts. The vehicles are be- ing repaired and will be able to rejoin to-day. I un- derstand the entire column was attacked at the same time. Those battalions in the woods got off lightly, but they didn’t have much of a chance to do any dam- age to the Red fliers. I understand one other plane was shot down.”
“Too bad we had to lose anyone,” replied the com- mander, “but you can’t have a war withvut someone getting hurt. Our casualties were about four per cent. How about the ammunition?”
“We used four thousand, one hundred and thirty rounds of caliber .30 and about two hundred rounds of
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pistol ammunition,” reported the operations officer. “Well,” spoke the executive, “Not bad! not bad! Guess we made the two per cent of hits they said we should make. We did clip a few wings.”
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CHAPTER VII
BATTALION IN ATTACK ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM
SECTION I SITUATION AND FIRST REQUIREMENT
1. SITUATION.—a. Topographical Map, Gettysburg—
Antietam, 1925, 1:21,120; Hunterstown sheet.
b. A Blue force, moving north on an offensive mis-
sion, having encountered a Red force late this afternoon, is developing preparatory to an attack.
c. At 6:00 PM, Colonel “1st Infantry” issued oral
orders, extracts of which follew:
“For enemy information, see Special map.
“For line now held by our advance guard, see special map.
“The 2d Infantry on our right is making the envelop- ment. The 3d Infantry is on our left.
“The 1st Battalion ist Field Artillery will support this regiment by a 15-minute preparation along the hostile front line and thereafter by successive concentrations. Particular attention will be paid to the orchard around RJ 592-B, hill 601-d and hill 1000 yards northeast of hill 584-d.
“This regiment will attack and assist the advance of the 2d Infantry.
“Time of attack: daylight, 18 May.
“Formation: ist and 2d Battalions in assault, 24 Bat- talion on the right.
“Boundary: see special map.
“Line of departure: line now held by the advance guard (see special map).
“The ist Battalion will assist the advance of the 2d Battalion.
“Regimental machine-gun company from positions in the woods north of RJ 610-M will support the attack by the fire of two platoons on hill 601-d and two platoons on the orchard near RJ 692-B.”
d. The ist Battalion Ist Infantry has not been en-
gaged. It is to be assembled in the woods north of RJ 629-E (see special map) by 7:00 PM. One platoon Can- non Company is attached to and is with the battalion.
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2. FIRST REQUIREMENT.—So much of the plan of attack of Lieutenant Colonel “1st Battalion 1st Infantry” as would appear in paragraphs 2 and 3 of a formal field order.
SECTION II SECOND SITUATION
3. A SOLUTION OF FIRST REQUIREMENT.—To at- tack at 3:55 AM with Companies A and B abreast, Com- pany A on the right.
Direction of attack: 354° magnetic azimuth.
Boundary between companies: road through RJ 557-E to Rolfe to Company A.
Company A to capture that portion of the enemy po- sition between RJ 557-E :and.RJ 592-B and hill 500 yards east of Rolfe and continue the attack.
Company B, with one platoon Company D attached, with its left resting on the road running south from RJ 552-F to attack initially on a frontage of 500 yards, cap- ture hill 584-d and continue the attack, assisting the ad- vance of Company A.
Company D (less one platoon) to support the attack; two platoons from the nose 600 yards northeast of CR 533-A to support Company A by firing initially in the vicinity of RJ 592-B, one platoon from the nose 600 yards southeast of RJ 592-B to support Company B; one pla- toon to be attached to Company B at once.
The ist Platoon Cannon Company from positions near the house east of CR 533-A to support the attack, paying particular attention to located hostile machine guns in the front of Company B.
4. SITUATION, CONTINUED.—The attack jumped off as ordered. At 5:00 AM, the situation is as follows:
(1) Company A is making slow progress about 400 yards northwest of RJ 592-B because of rifle and machine-gun fire from the hill 500 yards east of Rolfe. The support platoon
has not been employed. (2) Company B has captured hill 584-d but is making little progress in working down the north slope because of
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rifle and machine-gun fire from the hill 500 yards to the northeast and the nose 600 yards to the northwest of hill 584-d. Support platoon has not been employed. ,
(3) Company C is moving to the vicinity of the house south of RJ 557-E.
(4) The machine-gun platoon attached to Company B is on hill 584-d, firing on the nose to the northwest; the platoon in Company A’s zone is moving forward, head at RJ 592-B; one platoon in Company B’s zone is echeloning forward via the draw northeast of RJ 552-F; one platoon is in its original position.
The cannon platoon is being assembled at CR 5383-A.
(6) Contact patrols report little progress being made by adjacent battalions, particularly on the right. The bat- talion on the left is advancing slowly in the vicinity of road bend 531-B.
Lieutenant Colonel “1st Battalion” is on hill 584-d.
5. SECOND REQUIREMENT.—The plan of Lieutenant Colonel “ist Battalion” for continuing the attack.
SECTION III THIRD SITUATION
5. A SOLUTION OF SECOND REQUIREMENT.—To continue the attack on red Very pistol signal from hill 584-d with Companies A and B upon the arrival of the battalion supporting weapons.
One platoon of Company D on hill 584-d to continue on present mission in present position; one platoon now near RJ 592-B to take position in edge of the woods northwest of RJ 592-B and fire on hill to the northwest; one platoon now in the draw east of RJ 552-F to move to the saddle east of hill 584-d and place fire on hill to the northeast; the platoon southeast of RJ 552-F to move on hill 584-d when the platoon moving into the saddle is in position.
The cannon platoon to move forward to positions from which it can place fire on the hill east of Rolfe.
Company C to remain in present position.
To request artillery fire on hill east of Rolfe.
7. SITUATION, CONTINUED.—Companies A and B, assisted by the combined fire of the supporting weapons, captured the hill east of Rolfe. The advance continued
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to the stream line just north of Rolfe. Both rifle com- panies have now been stopped along this stream by fire from the woods on the slope to the north. The support platoon of Company A has been used; support platoon of Company B has not been used. Casualties in all as- sault platoons have been heavy.
Two platoons of Company D are firing from hill 584-d and two platoons from hill east of Rolfe.
Infantry mortars are along the stream south of RJ 557-E; 37-mm guns are on hill east of Rolfe.
Company C is in the woods near RJ 557-E.
The unit on the right has captured hill 601-d and is in the edge of the woods to the northwest of this hill The unit on the left is along the stream abreast of the Ist Battalion.
8. THIRD REQUIREMENT.—The plan of Lieutenant Colonel “1st Battalion.”
SECTION IV A SOLUTION OF THIRD REQUIREMENT
9. A SOLUTION OF THIRD REQUIREMENT. — The plan of Lieutenant Colonel “1st Battalion” is as follows:
To employ his reserve company, moving it into the woods west of hil] 601-d and attacking in the direction of the house at the end of the unimproved road south of RJ 548-L.
Company B to attack in conjunction with Company C.
Company A to assist the attack by fire from its present position; to reorganize in the valley west of hill 601-d as battalion reserve when the hostile position has been cap- tured.
To launch the attack as soon as Company C is in po- sition.
Company D to support the attack from present po- sitions.
lst Platoon Cannon Company to support the attack from positions in the vicinity of hill east of Rolfe. - To request artillery fire on the patch of woods 500 yards south of RJ 548-L.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE OPERATIONS OF COMPANY “K”, 38TH IN- FANTRY, 3D DIVISION (U.S.) IN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE MEUSE-ARGONNE 8-9 OCTOBER, 1918
BY CAPTAIN ROBERT G. MOSS. INFANTRY
«PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE AUTHOR)
NOTE.—The following personal-experience monograph was delivered at The Infantry School in connection with the 1927-28 course in military history. It is included in this volume of the Mailing List because of the value and interest it is believed to contain as an example of the op- erations of a small unit.
Captain Robert G. Moss was a native of Annapolis, Maryland, where he attended St. Johns College from which he was graduated in 1911. He served four months on the Mexican Border in 1916 as a Ist Lieutenant, Maryland National Guard, and was commissioned a 2d Lieutenant, U. S. Army, in November, 1916. He was successively promoted to 1st Lieutenant and Captain, serving in the latter grade throughout the war. As the commanding officer of Company K 388th Infantry, 3d Division, he participated in six engagements for which battle clasps were awarded, and received two silver stars with citations for valor. He died on April 6, 1928, while a member of the Advanced Class of The Infantry School.
(The school is anxious to receive comments from subscribers to the Mailing List expressing their views as to the desirability of including material of this character. If the consensus of opinion is favorable it is contemplated that other personal experience mono- graphs will appear in the future.
The limitations of this volume required the elimination and condensation of certain less important statements. Such instances have been noted by employing asterisks or italics).
On 26 September, 1918, the First American Army and the Fourth French Army attacked the German left, west of the Meuse River with the objective of cutting the
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German lateral traffic line whieh ran hrough Longuyon and Sedan. The American attack planned an original double penetration in order to “pinch out’ Montfaucon, followed by a main effort along the axis: Montfaucon— Romagne-sous-Montfaucon—Buzancy, to “pinch out” the Argonne Forest. It is with an attack along this axis in the vicinity of Romagne that this narrative deals.
On 30 September the 3d Division relieved the 79th Division (the right division of the Vth Corps) along the Nantillois-Cierges road between the Nantillois-Cunel road and the Cierges-Romagne road. On 4 October the 3d Division attacked, with the 5th Brigade (4th and 7th In- fantry Regiments) leading, and reached the northern edge of Woods 250 and the southern slope of Hill 253.. Meet- ing very strong resistance from the southern edge of the Bois de Cunel and the crest of Hill 253, further attempts to advance were unsuccessful.
(Ed. Note.—The towns of Romagne—Cunel—Nantillois—Cierges form a rough rectangle, the two latter being approximately a thou- sand yards south of the border of the map).
During the night 7-8 October the 6th Brigade rclieved the 5th Brigade, the 30th Infantry on the right occupying Woods 250 and the 38th Infantry, with the 3d Battalion in front, occupying the southern slope of Hill 253.
* * * * +
Hill 253 was the rearmost position of the Giselher Stellung which began one kilometer north of Cierges, and which was an unorganized natural defensive zone covering the Kriemhilde Stellung, the last fortified po- sition of the Hindenburg Line in this region. The narrow crest of Hill 253 was well suited to the German system of defense*** as a relatively small force with many ma- chine guns could command every approach, the task be- ing facilitated by the utter absence of woods except im- mediately to the east. The lack of vegetable covering was compensated for, in part, however, by the morning and evening mists, the former of which, in low places, some- times remained until after 9:00 AM.
. + 7 7 *
On 30 September Company K 38th Infantry had re-
ceived enough maps and airplane photographs to include
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platoons, and an advance study of this material of the area in which it was known the 5th Brigade was oper- ating, proved extremely valuable in gaining familiarity with unseen terrain features and in planning in advance for countering resistance from the most probable enemy positions.
Upon moving into its present position the effective strength of Company K was 4 officers and about 180 men, the latter being distributed equally among the 4 platoons. The men were in poor physical condition as the result of constant exposure, irregular food and fre- quent night marches. Morale was satisfactory but there was no “straining at the leash” of which we read so frequently, particularly in unit histories. Nor was such a spirit ever observed in any unit, a quiet acquiescence to combat instructions being rather the rule. About 20 per cent had seen action on the Vesle River in August and the remainder had been with the company through all engagements. Three of the officers had previous combat experience while the fourth had joined the company less than a month before. **Upon relieving the 7th Infantry on the southern slopes of Hill 253 the officers of that or- ganization had informed the commanding officer of Com- pany K that the crest of the hill was strongly held with infantry and machine guns and that they had no contact with the units on either flank. Company I 38th Infantry had taken a position on the southwest nose of Hill 253 but the uncertainty of the situation on the front and right flank demanded information.
As soon as the company commander had inspected the dispositions of Company K a patrol was sent out to the right to try to locate the 30th Infantry but reported back in about two hours without gaining contact. An officer with five men was sent to reconnoiter the crest of Hill 253 but he, too, returned in about two hours stating that he had penetrated the enemy line for a short distance and was sure the crest was strongly held. It Was an unvarying experience that when something im- portant had to be done by active patrolling it was neces- sary to have an officer lead the patrol.
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With the certainty of a strong force on the crest and no contact on the right flank, local security became of prime importance, so the combat platoons were instructed to send listening patrols close up to the crest while the 4th Platoon sent a similar group well out to the right.
At 5:30 AM, 8 Octeber, Company H 38th Infantry ar- rived at Hill 253, having been sent forward from brigade reserve with orders to reconnoiter the crest of the hill and thence north to the main position of the Kriemhilde Stellung. The company commander of Company H dis- played orders stating that he would be supported by Com- panies I and K. After a conference of the company com- manders the attack was launched at about 6:30 AM and Company K succeeded in reaching a point within 50 yards of the crest where it was definitely stopped by intense machine-gun and rifle fire. Company H succeeded in working its way on the left of Company K slightly past the crest of the hill where its leader was killed. Com- pany I remained in its original position protecting the left.
The attack of Company K would probably have carried the crest of the hill had not two morale-destroying fac- tors occurred to stop its momentum. When within 60 yards of the enemy position Lieutenant Hays who was commanding the leading platoon leaped in front of the platoon and by shouting and gesticulating worked the men into a dogged sort of trot. This charge had covered about 20 yards when Lieutenant Hays fell, mortally wounded. As if at the same instant the charge stopped dead. The fall of the leader, visible to all, had killed the confidence of those whose entire dependence was in him. This tendency was uniformly observed in other operations. Another factor contributing to the halt of the charge was the shooting through the left shoulder of a man in the leading wave of the 2d Platoon by a man in the rear wave. This had happened once before, north of the Marne, and during the training periods frequent warn- ings against its repetition had been given with strict or- ders that rear waves keep pieces locked. However, in
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the confusion of such close qiiatters it is a li®ely oecur- rence. Its demoralizing effect is great.
As the positions of Companies H and K were being subjected to an intense shrapnel fire as well as that of infantry weapons it was planned to hold the present po- sitions until dusk and then rush the crest. This plan was reported to the battalion commander at 9:00 AM by run- ner. Shortly after noon, however, the runner returned with a written message stating that a division order re- quired that the troops be withdrawn to the foot of the hill by 3:00 PM so that the crest could be shelled. (This was part of the artillery preparation for the next day’s attack.) The order was complied with and the platoons of Company’ KE returned to their former position leaving two observation posts at the points of farthest advance. The artillery fire arrived on schedule and would have been followed up with a renewal of the attack but it passed well beyond the crest doing no damage there. At 4:30 PM the observation posts came in reporting that the Ger- mans seemed about to counterattack. This was correct but it was executed in a half-hearted manner and was easily beaten back with some slight loss to the Germans.
At about 5:30 PM the 3d Battalion adjutant arrived with instructions for the company commanders to accom- pany him to the battalion command post at Cierges to receive orders for an attack which was to take place the following morning—9 October. Leaving instructions to the second-in-command to attend to the evacuation of the wounded and to send out security groups similar to those employed the preceeding night, the company commander proceded to Cierges.
The plan for the attack on 9 October required the companies of the 3d Battalion to move to the east, the division zone having been narrowed in that direction. Companies I and K to be relieved by groups from the 32d Division which was to the left of the 3d Division and then to move to the east through the valley of the Rau de Coup about 600 yards into the new zone of action. (The regi- mental zone as shown on the attached map was copied onto their maps by the company commanders).
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The plan detailed to the company commanders of the 8d Battalion during the night of 8 October by the bat- talion commander was based upon Field Orders No. 16, 6th Brigade, 8 October 1918, which provided as follows:
“The Vth Corps attacks at 8:30 AM, 9 October.
“The 6th Brigade attacks for the 3d Division.
“Eastern boundary: Nantillois-Cunel road (incl)— Cunel . (incl).
“Western boundary: Crest of Hill 253—point 500 meters east of Romagne—Bantheville (incl).
(Ed Note:—Bantheville is approximately 2 kilometers slightly northwest of Romagne.)
“30th Infantry, right and 38th Infantry, left. One battalion of each regiment in front initially. Sectors shown on maps furnished.
“Ist Battalion 30th Infantry and 2d Battalion 38th Infantry, with attached machine-gun companies, are brigade reserve in their present positions.
“Jumping-off line: 38th Infantry: Rau de Moussin to point 9235, west edge of Bois de Cunel.
“Attack of 38th Infantry will start at H plus 1 hours. Mission: to capture Trench de Mamelle.
“The attack will be covered by a rolling barrage. Preparation starts at 1:00 PM.
“Machine guns: present assignments of companies of the 9th Machine-Gun Battalion to infantry battalions will be retained.
Machine guns will not join infantry waves but will advance by bounds, keeping pace with the in- fantry advance, in rear of their battalions.
“Company D Ist Gas Regiment will place a smoke screen along the south edge of the Bois de Cunel at H minus 10.
“The 38th Infantry will maintain combat liaison with the 32d Division.
It will follow the barrage very closely, especially to the Trench de la Mamelle which will be as- saulted immediately after the barrage lifts.
It will organize the high ground approximately 300. meters south of the Romagne-Cunel road.”
_ 7 ~ 7 -
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The artillery preparation was planned to start at 1:00 PM 8 October and continue until H hour, then to form as accompanying fire preceding the assault units until 11:58 AM, 9 October. At H hour the 75-mm regiments were to fire a rolling barrage from the line of departure, ad- vancing in three hours and twenty-eight minutes a dis- tance of twelve hundred meters to the objective, holding meanwhile, for ten minutes on the Mamelle Trench.
Within the 3d Battalion Companies I and K were designated as assault companies, Company I on the right. They were to be supported by Companies L and M re- spectively. The assault companies were to drive forward and occupy the objective.
Of the enemy situation confronting it little was known by Company K. It knew Hill 253 and the south edge of Cunel Woods to be strongly held. The map and airplane photograph showed the Trench de la Mamelle protected by barbed wire—two wide bands. Behind it, at Romagne and Bantheville were shown large supply depots. North of the Mamelle Trench no fortified area was shown. So it was fair to assume that the position which was to be entered was an important one and would be strongly de- fended.
Corps and army knew more about this situation, but their data, perhaps fortunately, were not available to the assaulting units. An airplane photograph taken on 6 October showed evidences of heavy road circulation on the road north of Romagne, pointing to the rapid evacuation of the supply depots. It also showed that new machine- gun and minenwerfer and shelter pits were being con- structed around the Mamelle Trench. Vth Corps had concluded that the enemy would “resist energetically all attacks against the Kriemhilde Stellung,” of which, in this vicinity, the Mamelle Trench was the first line.
In front of Company K was the 115th German Di- vision, rated as fair, with the 136th Regiment on Hill 253. From Hill 253 to Cunel Woods was the 173d Regi- ment of the same division, with two battalions in line and one in reserve. According to prisoners, the rifle companies of the former regiment numbered forty men
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with four light machine guns; and the machine-gun com- panies numbered fifty men and twelve heavy machine guns. In the latter regiment the rifle companies averaged about sixty-five men with three light machine guns. The machine-gun companies were so depleted that they could use only six of their guns. Each company had one anti- tank rifle. One company, numbering about eighty men, with 6 75-mm mortars, from the 21st Minenwerfer Bat- talion was in the Mamelle Trench, and part of the 52d Sharpshooter Machine-Gun Detachment, which had ar- rived 8 October was defending the crest north of the Mamelle Trench. This detachment consisted of three companies of twelve guns each with six men to a gun crew. The 110th Regiment, 28th German Division, was between Romagne and Cunel.
Aceording to the best information in the possession of the Vth Corps the Germans were holding the Mamelle Trench, had received additional fresh artillery and had evidenced no intention of withdrawing.
On the left of the 38th Infantry the 32d Division had small groups en Hill 258 from which the line ran south- westerly to Gesnes.
The effectives who took the wounded to the rear dur- ing the night of 8-9 October not having returned, Com- pany K formed for attack with a strength of three of- ficers and about one hundred and twenty enlisted men. In compliance with verbal instructions from the division commander through the regimental commander to the 8d Battalion officers in its training area the company took up the prescribed habitual formation: column of platoons. The order of platoons was: Ist, 2d, 3d, 4th, with 100 yards distance between platoons. The order of platoons wag determined by the desirability of having an experienced officer with the leading platoon to give it momentum, and of having an officer with the rear pla- toon to check straggling. Lieutenant Wood (leading platoon) was noticed to be ill, with a high temperature. If he had asked to be evacuated there would have been nothing to do but comply, but he made no complaint. Lieutenant Young (rear platoon) was instructed as to
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watching for stragglers and sending them forward to their platoons.
The brigade attack order clearly stated that the regi- ment would attack from the Rau de Moussin at 9:30 AM but minds and bodies numbed with fatigue refused to entertain an idea which entailed greater and earlier ef- fort. It is an honest belief that it did not oceur to a soul in the 3d Battalion that the order meant for the at- tack to be launched from present positions in time to be continued from the Rau de Moussin at 9:30 AM. The order was simply accepted as an error by higher au- thority as to the location of the present front line.
Finally, at 9:10 AM, when there seemed to be no danger of running into friendly artillery fire, none yet having been in evidence, and when the covering mist, which was unusually heavy and lasting this morning, seemed to be thinning a little, permission was obtained from the battalion commander to start Company K for- ward. This was accomplished by arm signal, the rear platoons gaining distance as the one ahead advanced. A distinct feeling of relief is recalled as the leading platoon emerged from the small rectangular woods without loss of direction. The position of the company and its direc- tion would take its left over the extreme eastern edge of the crest of Hill 253 while its right would just escape an enemy establishment which appeared, on the airplane photograph of 15 August, to have been the four emplace- ments of a battery position, but which, it was anticipated, might now have been converted into an infantry point of resistance. No scouts preceded the advance, the platoons being deployed in only one wave each on account of their reduced numbers and automatic rifles being placed on the left flank in view of the known enemy occupation of Hill 253.
The company command group was midway between the leading and second platoons.
As the extreme left of the leading platoon arrived just northeast of the crest of Hill 253 the group composing it (extreme left, leading platoon, Company K) was observed to be firing to its left rear from a standing position. The
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fire-of these men, including an automatic rifleman, con- tinued for several minutes in the original direction and then changed toward the north as if following moving targets. The men later told their platoon leader that they had been firing into the backs of the Germans on Hill 253 and that a large number of them had fled. Com- pany M, in support of Company K, was by this time ad- vancing directly against Hill 253. and this probably con- tributed largely to the rout. It is known that the advance over Hill 253 by Company M was accomplished against little or no resistance.
The attack now advanced rapidly for about three hun- dred yards when a violent burst of machine-gun fire from the right front forced the entire company to take cover. When the mist had cleared sufficiently the fire was dis- covered to be coming from the most southerly of the former artillery emplacements referred to above. It spread out fan-wise covering the entire front. The em- placement had been enlarged to a square about twenty feet on a side. It had been walled-up with logs to a height of about three feet, and roofed over, the top-most covering being loose earth. The firing was all from the southern face of the nest, the guns apparently firing through slits between the logs.
The leading platoon was nearly abreast of the em- placement, the 2d and 3d Platoons were in the exercise trenches, the leader of the 2d Platoon plainly visible crouching in the northernmost parallel. The 4th Platoon was just emerging from the small rectangular wovds. Artillery fire was falling to the company’s right and minenwerfer fire from the Mamelle Trench was falling short. Our own artillery was placing a good concentra- tion on the Mamelle Trench. The situation was reported to the battalion commander and 37-mm gun fire against the emplacement requested. A man from the battalion intelligence section who had been detailed to accompany Company K sent in a report by the same runner. Com- pany I was not observed to be on the right. It was practically out of action, its commander having been killed, and its two other officers having been wounded
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at the very beginning of the attack. It did not appear to the right of Company K again during the day, but the battalion commander sent Company L along the western edge of-Cunel Woods to protect the right.
A group of about forty Germans suddenly appeared running from Cunel Woods toward Romagne. The leader of the 2d Platoon was instructed to open fire at them by the signal “Commence firing” and pointing. A fairly brisk overhead fire was promptly delivered and while no effect was observed it probably added to the confusion and extended the distance of the retirement.
Two American soldiers were now observed to emerge from Cunel Woods, one following the other at about ten paces. They ran along a sort of hedge line which pro- jected from the woods. Suddenly the leading man made a lunge with his bayonet, withdrew it quickly, ran about fifteen yards further again lunged and withdrew, then both turned and ran back into the woods. This was the only occasion in any operation when the actual use of the bayonet was observed.
Company K had now succumbed to the tremendous inertia of the battlefield. From most of the make-shift shelters tobacco smoke was rising. The westernmost gun of the nest was using fixed fire, the pattern of its bursts could be observed striking against an embankment just east of the crest of Hill 253. The leading platoon was well beyond this band of fire but was making no attempt to move. Upon moving forward to the leading platoon it was discovered that its position was being sprayed with long-range machine-gun fire from the direction of the crest-north of the Mamelle Trench. The platoon was entirely without cover, one man was sheltering himself behind the dead body of a comrade. The leader of this platoon was instructed to work the left of his line for- ward and to the right and get in rear of the emplace- ment. This movement was started promptly but was necessarily slow and painful in execution. As soon as it had made material progress toward the rear of the em- placement the occupants of the emplacement waved a white rag on a stick for a few seconds and then filed out
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—————
It was with the greatest difficulty that restrained from harming the prison- ers. One of the converging groups was discovered to be the battalion commander and his headquarters, and with him the group of about twenty prisoners was left in order promptly to continue the advance with the greatest pos- sible gain of momentum.
The platoons were reformed rapidly and with the ist Platoon still leading Company K swept down the hill
American troops were now observed to be advancing on the left of Company K. These later were discovered to be men of Company M, 38th Infantry, which had ad- vanced over Hill 253 and several times had moved out of the 3d Division zone of action to attack machine guns. The direction of Company M was taking it toward that part of the Mamelle Trench near the Romagne-Cierges road.
The advance of Company K was under a severe ma- chine-gun and rifle fire from Cunel Woods and some poor- ly directed machine-gun fire from the front. Lieutenant Young, at the head of the rear platoon was shot through the spine and killed. One bullet wounded two men, tak- ing effect in each case in the lower leg. The first man was shot through the calf, but merely grinned and said, “They got me,” and continued the advance. The other man had a bone shattered and fell to the ground, ap- pearing to be in extreme pain.
Direction could now be maintained with reference to the church steeple in Romagne, and the Ist Platoon which veered too much to the east toward Cunel Woods was re- called by whistle and pointing, while the command group and 2d Platoon approached the wire in front of Mamelle Trench where all took cover as did the Ist Platoon when it arrived a few minutes later.
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It was now just a minute or two after noon. At noon the 32d Division to the left was reported as holding a general line the right gf which was one and one-half kilo- meters in rear of the position of Company K. However, by 11:00 PM, 9 October, this division had occupied the Mamelle Trench. The 30th Infantry to the right was fighting its way through Cunel Woods, reaching the northern edge by nightfall.
The halt by Company K in front of the Mamelle Trench wire was for the purpose of cutting gaps to supplement one cut by the artillery. On the previous evening the patro] sent out to secure contact on the right flank had stumbled over and secured a pile of eight wire cutters. These now proved immensely valuable. Of the original eight pairs only two remained, but with these two gaps were cut with great rapidity, one man cutting while another cleared aside the wire. Through these gaps the Ist Platoon, about twenty men, closely followed by the command group and the 2d Platoon, passed in small columns and charged the trench. They found no Germans, but only signs of recent occupation, including a minenwerfer and an antitank rifle. The advance did. not pause, but the platoons and command group moved rapidly over the crest beyond. Stationed on the south- western nose of Hill 260, in plain view, and about twelve hundred yards distant, was a battery of German artillery, evidently placed there for tank defense. These now opened a terrific fire with high explosive and shrapnel. The latter burst about waist-high with an unearthly shrieking of slugs, while the former made several direct hits, the men disappearing entirely or with only the smoking stump of a leg remaining. Later in dressing wounded it was noticed that their helmets and clothing were flecked with bits of red flesh.
The dash and sweep of the attack were gone but the impression given now was one of dogged determination, coupled with an overpowering fatigue, and of faculties incapable of reacting to even the most violent shock. The crouching posture and lowered bayonets denoted that the remaining dependence was in that weapon and that only a strong desire to use it was carrying them forward.
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The trench 900 yards slightly south of east of Ro- Magne was unoccupied, and at about 12:30 PM Company K halted on the objective, and took up a defensive po- sition with a field of fire to the Romagne-Cunel road. The remnants of the lst and 2d Platoons were combined to hold this line. Toward the end of the advance, elements of Companies M and A were observed advancing across the low ground about 400 yards to the southwest and part of the direct artillery fire was switched to them. Com- pany M had met and overcome resistance at the Mamelle Trench, and had been sent forward by the battalion com- mander to cover the left of Company K. Company A had made a rapid advance along the regimental left boundary from its position with the reserve battalion. The artillery, machine-gun and sniper fires were incessant.
The 3d and 4th Platoons of Company K halted at the Mamelle Trench and began mopping it up in both di- rections. A part of the 3d Platoon mopped up the trench toward the west as far as the Romagne-Cierges road, then followed the road northward into the southern part of Romagne, and returned with twenty-one prisoners, including an officer. Such events as this lead to the im- pression that a town has been captured, in fact the First Army announced on the following day that Romagne had been, when actually it was not until 14 October.
At about 2:30 PM a group of eighteen Germans who had been hiding in the hollow about 200 yards to the front came forward unarmed and surrendered. Nearly all of these men were from the 52d Sharpshooter Ma- chine-Gun Detachment, and were fine physical specimens. Their clothing was new and clean. Not a man could be spared to guard them to the rear, our own wounded were lying all around unattended. So the direction was indi- cated and they were following it at a sharp trot when they disappeared. There may be some connection be- tween this incident and that reported in the “Stars and Stripes” of 11 October, which stated that a group of prisoners of this size was wandering around unattended in a rear area on 10 October.
At about 4:00 PM a counterattack was launched from the Romagne-Cunel road but it was shattered by rifle and (98)
automatic-rifie fire before it was well started. Shortly after this Lieutenant Wood was killed by a rifle bullet through the head.
By dusk the 2d Battalion had come forward as assault battalion and occupied the Mamelle Trench, pushing com- bat groups well forward. Through this battalion the few survivors of Company K withdrew, the withdrawal con- sisting largely of bearing to the rear the wounded of the three companies, parts of which had occupied the objective. The 3d Battalion, numbering three officers and about two hundred enlisted men, was placed in a support position about 700 yards northeast of the crossing of the Rau de Moussin and the Romagne-Cunel road.
Company K had made an advance of nearly two and one-half kilometers, effecting the first entry into the Kriemhilde Stellung. On 9 October the Vth Corps cap- tured about one thousand prisoners. Of this number the 3d Division captured about three hundred of which Com- pany K captured about sixty in addition to many machine guns, a minenwerfer and an antitank rifle.
The two days of fighting cost Company K three of- ficers, three sergeants, five corporals and fourteen pri- vates killed, and sixty-four of all grades wounded.
The Kriemhilde Stellung was by no means ruptured, however, even in front of the 3d Division, for stronger heights to the north still remained to the Germans.
LESSONS
1. That exposure and irregular food before entering the front line materially reduce the combat efficiency of troops, so that even though a unit may just have entered the line it is not necessarily fresh.
2. Information gained by battle reconnaissance to be of maximum value must come from one in whom the com- mander has utter confidence. When, therefore, it is necessary to assign a dangerous and important mission to a patrol it is also necessary to have an officer lead the patrol.
8. In combat enlisted men depend almost entirely upon their officers and accurately reflect their moods and
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characteristics. When the guiding hand falters so do the followers. Commanders, then, must constantly think ahead and be prepared to act promptly and with as- surance.
4. Battlefield liaison is extremely difficult to maintain even between closely adjacent units, particularly when under an effective fire.
5. When skirmishers advance in successive lines at short distances there is danger of men in rear waves shooting those ahead. Such occurrences are demoralizing.
6. Too much information of enemy strength reduces the confidence of attacking infantry.
7. Field orders must be absoiutely unmistakable in meaning, not entirely because those who interpret them are of low mentality, but because, due to great fatigue and mental strain, their comprehension is dulled and their reasoning distorted. The immediate situation is suffi- ciently impressive to exclude contemplation of general considerations unless no other course is possible.
8. Airplane photographs are of immense value to in- fantry commanders in gaining advance familiarity with terrain, in maintaining direction during attack, in antici- pating and planning to meet enemy resistance, but as a supplement, only to good maps, when available. The more recent the photograph the greater its value.
9. The average American soldier, when sufficiently informed as to a situation, will act on his own inifiative provided the course is clear and a highly desirable re- sult will probably be attained. Company K was well in- formed as to the enemy strength on Hill 253 and in passing the flank of that position on 9 October had been unpleasantly conscious of the possibilities of that strength. So, without orders, the first men given the opportunity seized it and fired into the backs of the defenders.
10. Bands of grazing machine gun fire are not im- passable.
11. A thin line of skirmishers under an officer cover- ing that front afford better protection and are not a much better target than scouts. In addition they expedite the advance. The war-time private soldier lacks the
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confidence and training necessary to bold action far in advance of his platoon. Other than bold action is a positive detriment. When, through experience, he at- tains these qualities he becomes non-commissioned officer material.
12. Large wire cutters are of great value in rapidly cutting through bands of barbed wire, even in the hands of men unfamiliar with their manipulation. In this connection, any piece of equipment for opportune use by the rifle company in combat should be supplied in greater numbers than the actual requirement and widely distributed in order that a sufficient supply be avail- able when needed.
13. The main dependence of the infantry must be in the rifle and the bayonet. Other weapons may or may not be present and make their contribution, but a main re- liance in them or any one of them is misplaced. The riflemen is present when needed. To be of value he must have confidence in his weapons. It is confidence in his rifle that induces him to risk drawing hostile attention to himself and his location by opening fire. It is con- fidence in his bayonet and a strong desire to use it that induces him to expose himself and go forward. The bay- onet is to the rifleman the symbol of aggressiveness. They should be fixed when the approach march starts.
14. The belief that the flight of the German group from Cunel Woods through the Mamelle Trench swept the defenders of the trench along with it warrants the statement that nothing is more demoralizing to defenders than the withdrawal of another unit through them. Therefore, local security groups should be obtained from rear elements in defense and should be required to with- draw around a flank.
15. The greatest obsctacle to successful attack is in- ertia—the intense desire to get behind the best nearby cover and stay there, bodily and mentally inert. No opportunity must be lost to overcome this inerita and give the attack all possible momentum. In a coordinated attack, until the objective (if any) is reached, flank con- tact is of secondary importance. The greatest momentum
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may be gained during the period of elation immediately following the capture of a hostile position, but first the strong tendency to loiter around the position must be overcome, and the reorganization must be the very brief- est that will serve.
16. No belief is had in a bravery that “knows no fear.” Many varied types have been observed. These include veterans of others wars, young college athletes and on down the scale to thugs and “gutter-rats.” It is a firm belief that, given sufficient personal danger, every normal human being will be afraid. While the numbing effect of great fatigue reduces the consciousness of the emotion there is only one characteristic which causes the individual to act in spite of fear. It is pride. A man devoid of pride is utterly worthless on the battlefield. He must be more afraid of disgrace than of injury. Hence, although national, racial and organizational prides are highly im- portant, the determnining factor ig personal pride. Those who train and manage the soldier should be ever mindful of the fact that to injure his pride is to injure his com- bat efficiency.
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\ JQ] operations OF r CO'K Sé™ INF
—_ - "= aw _ IvLe “eS ‘iin
&-9 OCT. 1918
ViFiOm
APPENDIX I
LIST OF MIMEOGRAPH INSTRUCTIONAL MATTER AND MAP REFERENCE
The following list of mimevgraphed instructional mat- ter of The Infantry School for the year 1930-31 is avail- able for sale in limited quantities by the Book Shop at the
indicated price:
SUBJECT
Marches and Shelter Marches and Shelter Marches and Shelter
LOGISTICS FORM MAPS M. P 1&2 M. P 3&4 M. P °
COMMAND AND STAFF
SUBJECT
Command
Combat Orders
Staff Maps
Staff Maps
Combat Intelligence Combat Intelligence Combat Intelligence Unit Journal & Report
MEDICAL SERVICE
SUBJECT Organization The Medica! Regiment Regt. Medical Detach Medical Service with a Reinforced Brigade
FIELD ENGINEERING
SUBJECT Field Fortification
SUBJECT
Supply of Infantry Units in Campaign
Supply of Infantry Units in Campaign
Ammunition Supply— Regim’t in Defense
Regimental Supply
FORM MAPS Conference None M. P. 3
Conference None M. P. 4&5 Conference None M, P. 3,4,@13 M. P. 6&7 M. P. 8
FORM MAPS Conference None Conference None Conference None
M. P. 8&9
FORM MAPS M. P. ° SUPPLY FORM MAPS Reference None Text
Conference None
M. P. os
TACTICS
SUBJECT FORM MAPS Estimate of the Situ- M. P. a ¢ 7 ation Estimate of the Situ- -_ Be 14, 15 ation Machine Gun and Can- M. P. . non Co. in Defense Battalion in Attack M. P. 1 Battalion in Defense M. P. ° Battalion in Defense M. P. 1 Regiment in Attack M. P. 20 Regiment in Defense M. P. 19 Brigade in Attack M. P. 1,2,8,9,10,13 Brigade in Defense M. P. 1,2,7,9,11,13 Brigade—Problem of M. .P. 13.16,17 Decision Brigade—Pursuit am oF 8,9,13 Brigade—Advance M. P. 19,21 Guard Brigade—Advance M. P. 8,9,12,13 Guard Brigade—Delaying M. P. 8, 9 Action Brigade—Change in M. P. 16,18 the Direction of March Brigade—Withdrawal M. P. 8,12,13 from Action MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECT FORM MAPS Troop Movement by Conference None Rail Troop Movement by M. P. 13 Rail Tanks Reference Text None Anti Tank Defense Conference None Organization and Mis- Conference None sion of the Air Corps
1-36M&M-a 1-25M
1-32M
1-37M
1-75M
1-48M
1-62M
1-67M
1-66M
NO. 1-44M
1-45M 1-4M
1-3M 1-89M
25
10
NOTE.—Asterisk denotes that special maps are furnished with the problem. No other maps are required.
When special maps are not furnished the maps required for the solution of the problem are listed according to the following code designation. Such maps as may be desired should be specified, and the total cost as an additional charge should be added to the list price of the problem.
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LIST OF MAPS TOPOGRAPHICAL MAPS, GETTYSBURG-ANTIETAM 1925, 1:21,120
i I TIS wiciccriesstictciccmniccrnc cir a eee $0.05 III III tec tsindcnisicibaiigplantehoiienssiaboas olcanencanepidlansiaacaainiaes .05 3. Emmitsburg Sheet ........................0 : ssdaslesethenicaimelell 05 GT: TI nsec vnccecscscsecseees ‘ soniniidiapcaneciaspiaadicaiaidiiaa 05 Se RES srenoamens eee e Seuiticsiahaliss cckacsvaillieansdadcmiinann .05 a iia ceaintietei nescence aaameeal PSEEDE Sum e F ic: BE HI, ficsetittristriteciharcnsenincncentciecareialeal eeeeaiie sie seriall 05 8. Bonneauville Sheet ............................ RE rR ee scieemabatands .05 ee I II i ciinsnisccishselancentoncsunbhdecisihietincentevieitniselibcedealeseneasaiilbaliatieg .05 | BT TI I w. caticctceccrtrcrvscierttcccssceniseees piciiiadaaadanatiaighaaie . 05 Bi FI IID, ciensticccietccasenenscosetnntinnonies sien PRREL SSR n eer nee ie eras .05 Be. I TRIED sicsscesnosichssesinndiinictinsssiaigseceilapespsndgpticeienslebainieiastabanntaaianebaibiaiel .05 13. General Map, Gettysburg 1925 1 inch equals |. eee 10 GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PENNA. 1:62,500 14. Chambersburg Quadrangle .................... RPO ed eH ALG .05 15. Hagerstown Quadrangle ......................... sb alaaniniamand eet 05 16. Gettysburg Quadrangle ........................ cae Pe aoa Fe —— 17. Taneytown Quadrangle ...................... _ .05 18. Fairfield Quadrangle ............................ e ; .05 GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GEORGIA, 1:62,500 19. Columbus Quadrangle ..........................-..--. 10 FIRE CONTROL MAPS 20. Fire Control Map, Fort Benning, Georgia, 1:20,000 ............ 15 21. Special Military Map, Fort Benning, Georgia 1:10,000 ........ 15
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